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I.
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this certified question are the Plaintiffs/Appellants, Gayle Burns,
and I.M.B, a minor (hereinafter "Burns" or "Appellants"), and the defendant Michael J.
Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter "Agency").
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OPENING BRIEF
IV.
JURISDICTION
Original jurisdiction upon this matter is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to Rule 41, Utah R.App.(a) and (c), Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Rule 41, Utah RApp.P. (a). Authorization to answer questions of
law. The Utah Supreme Court may answer a question of Utah law certified
to it by a court of the United States when requested to do so by such
certifying court acting in accordance with the provisions of this rule if the
state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying
court is uncertain.
Rule 41 Utah R.App.P.(c). Certification order.
(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme
Court and shall state:
(c)( 1 )(A) the question of law to be answered;
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of
law in a proceeding pending before the certifying court; and
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law.
V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question certified to the Utah Supreme Court:
Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in
the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent' in a record to
being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the
donor's death under Utah intestacy law, Utah Code Ann. §788-15-707
Traditional standards of review do not apply to certified questions from the Federal
District Court to the Utah Supreme Court, if there is no decision to affirm or reverse a

1

lower court's decision. Egbert v. Nissan North America. Inc.. 2007, 167 P.3d 1058, 585
Ut. Adv. Rep. 16, 2007 UT 64.
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
78B-15-102. Definitions
(1) "Adjudicated father" means a man who has been adjudicated by
a tribunal to be the father of a child. (Bold not in original)
(3) "Assisted reproduction" means a method of causing pregnancy
other than sexual intercourse. The term includes:
(a) intraurterine insemination;
(b) donation of eggs;
(c) donation of embryos;
(d) in vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and
(e) intracytoplasmic sperm injection.
(5) "Birth mother" means the biological mother of a child
(6) "Child" means an individual of any age whose parentage may be
determined under this chapter.
(9) "Determination of parentage" means the establishment of the
parent-child relationship by the signing of a valid declaration of paternity
under Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act, or adjudication by a
tribunal. (Bold not in original)
(18) "Parent-child relationship" means the legal relationship between
a child and a parent of the child. The term includes the mother-child
relationship and the father-child relationship.
(22) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable
in perceivable form.
(26) "Tribunal" means a court of law, administrative agency, or
quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support
orders or to determine parentage.

{

{

78B-15-104. Adjudication - Jurisdiction
(2) The district court and the juvenile court have jurisdiction over
proceedings under Parts 7 (Assisted Reproduction) and 8.
I
2
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788-15-201(2). The father-child relationship is established between
a man and a child by (e) the man having consented to assisted reproduction
by a woman under Part 7, Assisted Reproduction, which resulted in the
birth of the child:
78B-15-202. No discrimination based on marital status. A child
bom to parents who are not married to each other whose paternity has been
determined under this chapter has the same rights under the law as a child
bom to parents who are married to each other.
78B-15-703. Husband's paternity of child of assisted
reproduction. If a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted
reproduction by his wife as provided in Section 78B-15-704, he is the father
of the resulting child bom to his wife.
78B-15-704. Consent to assisted reproduction. (1) A consent to
assisted reproduction by a married woman must be in a record signed by the
woman and her husband.
78B-15-707. Parental status of deceased spouse. If a spouse dies
before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a
record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
spouse would be a parent of the child.
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Appellants brought this action to obtain surviving child's and mother's benefits
through the Social Security Act upon the death of their father/husband, Michael Bums
and his Social Security earnings record.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

In September, 2005, Appellant applied for two types of Social Security Survivor's
3

benefits - surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of the minor child, LM.B, and
surviving mother's insurance benefits based upon the earnings records of Michael Bums,
the deceased father/husband, (tr 50-55). The Agency denied the claims initially and
upon reconsideration found that Appellants had not shown that LM.B. was Mr. Bums'
"dependent child" as defined in the Social Security Act. (tr 56-60, 64-66). A hearing
was held on October 3, 2007 with Administrative Law Judge Donald R. Jensen presiding
and issuing a decision on August 22, 2008 reversing the denial of benefits, and finding
that based on the record evidence the Appellants were entitled to surviving child's and
mother's benefits on Mr. Bums' earnings records, (tr 28-39). On February 6, 2009, the
Agency's Appeals Council found "good cause to reopen the case pursuant to 20 CFR
§404.988 and 404.989 due to legal errors in the ALJ's decision" (tr 17-25) and issued a
decision on August 18, 2009 alleging errors in the ALJ's decision and concluded that the
Appellants had not shown that LM.B. was "the dependent child" of Mr. Bums as defined
under the Social Security Act and that the Appellants were not entitled to surviving
child's and mother's benefits on Mr. Bums'earnings record. (tr4-16). Thereafter
Appellants filed a Complaint in the United States District Court to be heard de novo on
October 14, 2009 with a redacted amended copy filed on October 16, 2009 (not in
transcript). The Agency filed a timely Answer to said Complaint (not in transcript).
Thereafter the United States Federal District Court did certify the question to the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah R.App.P., 41(a), and the Utah Supreme Court issued an

4

Order of Acceptance on August 5, 2010.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Michael Bums married Appellant Gayle Bums on August 24, 1997. (tr 68).

2.

In April 2000, Mr. Bums was told by his doctors that he had Non Hodgkins

Lymphoma, and a tumor behind his sternum, and he would require chemotherapy and
radiation therapy. He was told that he had a 95% chance of survival with chemotherapy
and radiation treatments, which treatment would most likely leave Mr. Bums sterile, (tr
231).
3.

Mr. Bums and his wife, Appellant Gayle M. Bums, signed a Semen Storage

Agreement on May 30, 2000. Thereafter, Mr. Bums deposited samples of his semen for
cryopreservation. (tr 69-72, 108-111).
4.

The Semen Storage Agreement, Section 1 stated: "The Donor has consulted

with a doctor and it has been determined that the Donor may be an appropriate candidate
to have his semen collected, evaluated, frozen and stored for his future use or other
possible uses as hereinafter set forth. (Bold not in original.) Semen is desired by the
donor for one more of the following reasons:
A.

Prior to vasectomy;

5

5.

B.

Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy;1

C.

Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications;

D.

Prior to exposure to potentially toxic environmental conditions;

E.

Prior to travel or extended absence of the donor;

F.

Prior to artificial insemination;

G.

Prior to shipment of the semen to another location;

H.

Or other reasons deemed appropriate by my Doctor, (tr 69, 108).

Mr. Bums also signed in the Semen Storage Agreement a statement:

In the event of the death of the donor, the donor would like his vials
of semen (initial 1 of the items below):
(A)

Destroyed

(B)

Maintained in storage for future donation to Gayle Burns (fill
in name and relationship)2 will assume all obligations and
terms described in this contract. MB [Mr. Bums'
initials], (tr 70-71, 109-110).
i

6.

On March 24, 2001, Mr. Bums died of cancer-related complications in Salt

Lake County, Utah, (tr 78).
7.

On May 3, 2003, Appellant had herself artificially inseminated with Mr.

Bums'cryopreserved semen, (tr 113-14).

Please note that no instructions were in the document to sign, circle, check or
initial to any of these "reasons." Someone, most likely Mr. Bums, circled choice "B,
Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy."
2

Filled in by Mr. Bums.

i

8.

Appellant gave birth to I.M.B. in Salt Lake County, Utah on December 23,

2003 as a result of the artificial insemination, (tr 113).
9.

Initially I.M.B.'s birth certificate did not reflect the name of his father,

Michael Burns, (tr 117). However, a request by Appellant for an amended birth
certificate (tr 116) reflecting Michael Burns as I.M.B.'s father was granted on September
3, 2004 by the Utah Department of Health, Office of Vital Records and Statistics, (tr 7983,118-20).
10.

The Social Security denials and approvals process then occurred as outlined

in Appellants' Statement of the Case (B), "Course of Proceedings and Dispositions,"
brief, p. 3-4.
11.

Elizabeth Park, the deceased wage earner's sister, was appointed as a

special administrator In the Matter of the Estate of Michael Burns (DOD 3/24/01),
Case No. 083900243 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Division, Utah, (tr
174-75). (Signed copies of formal probate documents not in transcript but in Appellants'
Addendum.)
12.

Appellant filed a Petition for Determination of Paternity In the Matter of

I.M.B. (DOB 12/23/03, a minor child, on November 9, 2007 in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Case No. 074904953 before the Honorable
Anthony B. Quinn. (tr 104-121).
13.

A hearing was held on March 18, 2008, with testimony being taken from
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Mrs. Burns and Elizabeth Park, Special Administrator, and Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law and an Order submitted and signed by the court on April 15, 2008.
(tr 167-75).
14.

In said Conclusions of Law it indicated that Petitioner had met their burden

of proof and there was clear and convincing evidence that I.M.B. was the son of Michael
A. Bums. Specifically in said Order, Judge Quinn stated, "That all rights arising from
said parent/child relationship, including those of care, custody, support and
inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of I.M.B,, a minor." (tr 168-9). (Bold
not in original.)
IX.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellants opine that the Semen Storage Agreement was sufficient under §78B15-704( 1) and §78B-15-707 to show that Michael Burns "consented in a record" that if a
child were to be born by assisted reproduction from his cryopreserved semen after his
death, the child would be considered his child and eligible as his heir under Utah intestacy
law, and thus eligible for surviving child Social Security benefits.

(

• X.
ARGUMENT
Under the Social Security Act, the surviving child of a deceased insured wage
earner may apply for insurance benefits on the Social Security earnings records of the
i

8
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deceased parent. Also, under the Social Security program a surviving natural parent of a
surviving child is entitled to surviving parent's insurance benefits based on the Social
Security earnings records of the same deceased insured wage earner.
Because both I.M.B.'s and Mrs. Bums' entitlement to benefits is dependent upon
I.M.B.'s relationship to the wage earner within the meaning of the Social Security Act,
arguments for Mrs. Bums and I.M.B. in this brief will be referred collectively as one, for
simplicity.
Two sections of the Social Security Act are relevant for determining whether
claimant qualifies as the insured's child for purposes of entitlement to benefits. The
certified question only envelops 42 U.S.C. 216(H)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act.3
Under this section, a surviving child is entitled to surviving child's benefits if he could
inherit from the wage earner's estate under the intestacy laws of the state in which the
insured was domiciled when he died.4,5

3

The other sections of the Social Security Code are not applicable and not
addressed in this brief.
4

See 42 U.S.C, §416(H)(2)(A); 20 CFR 404.355(A)(1) determining whether a
child can inherit an insured wage earner's property the agency commissioner applies the
version of the state intestacy law that is in effect when the claim is being adjudicated.
5

20 CFR §404.355(B)(4), if a child cannot inherit under the version of state law in
effect at the time of adjudication, then the agency may apply the version of state law that
was in effect when the insured died, or any version of state law in effect from the date the
application was filed up until the agency's final decision on the application to determine
whether a child can inherit a wage earner's property.
9

QUESTIONS FOR THIS COURT
The question from the Federal District Court is:
Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in
the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent' in a record to
being the 4 parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the
donor's death under Utah intestacy law, Utah Code Ann, §78B-15-707
The Federal District Court needs a determination whether I.M.B. would be an
intestate heir of Michael Bums under the Utah Assisted Reproduction Act, in conjunction
with the Semen Storage Agreement as signed by Mr. and Mrs. Bums at the University of
Utah Reproductive Assistance Center. U.C.A. §78B-15-707 states:
"If spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the
deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased
spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur
after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child.
Appellants believe that there are two arguments to be made, which will be
addressed separately:
(1) Was the Semen Storage Agreement, standing on its own,
sufficient to determine that Mr. Burns "consented in a record to
assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7, Assisted
Reproduction, which resulted in the birth of the child," U.C. A. §78B15-201(2)(e) and, if so, did Mr. Burns consent "in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after [his] death, [he] would be a
parent of the child? U.C.A. §786-15-707.

<

Appellants believe the Semen Storage Agreement clearly supports this position.
Argument number two for this court is:
•

<

10
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(2) If the Semen Storage Agreement was ambiguous or vague in
determining this question, the court must go outside the document for
any relevant evidence that supports or disproves that Mr. Burns did or
did not desire a child created by his cryopreserved semen to be
considered his natural child and heir even after his death.
Argument I
Did Mr. Burns consent in a record signed by him and his wife that he would
be the resulting father of the child born to his wife under the Utah Assisted
Reproduction Act even after his death? U.C.A. §788-15-701, et. seq.
The term "record" is defined under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act as
"information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or
other medium, and is retrievable in perceivable form. U.C.A. §78B-15-102.
Clearly the Semen Storage Agreement from the University of Utah School of
Medicine, Salt Lake City, Utah, Division of Urology, is a record maintained by the
University of Utah, a state entity. The letters from the Reproductive Care Center (tr 113),
University of Utah School of Medicine, Douglas T. Carrell, Associate Professor of
Surgery (Urology), OB/GYN and Physiology (tr 114) and Debbie Cartmill, M.S., of the
Andrology Program at the University of Utah (tr 115) are stored in a database at the
University of Utah and are retrievable records in a medium inscribed upon computers or
hard copies of Mr. and Mrs. Burns and are available to public or private entities in certain
limited circumstances, i.e., health insurance, other physicians, attorney/client consent.
Also, the requests for amendments to the birth certificate of I.M.B. was titled,

11

"Affidavit to Amend a Record" (tr 116) and were issued by "Utah Department of Health,
Office of Vital Records and Statistics." (tr 117-120). These are "records" as
contemplated and defined under the definitions of "record" under Utah law. U.C.A.
§78B-15-102(26).
Finally, the transcripts of the Social Security hearing and the court documents of
the Third Judicial District Courts should also be considered "records" for this matter.
Assuming these are sufficient "records," next we must visit the argument of
whether Mr. Bums "consented in a record" to being the parent of a child conceived by
artificial means after his death.
Under the first scenario, we must look at the Semen Storage Agreement standing
alone to determine whether Mr. Bums knew and desired that a child could be conceived
and bom and considered his natural child and heir, even after his death using the
cryopreserved semen.
Under the Semen Storage Agreement, there were eight reasons that a donor could:
"have his semen collected, evaluated, frozen and stored for his future use or
other possible uses as herein set forth. Semen is desired by the donor for
one or more of the following reasons: (bold not in original)
A. Prior to vasectomy;
B. Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy;
C. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications;
D. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic environmental conditions;
E. Prior to travel or extended absence of the donor;
F. Prior to artificial insemination;
G. Prior to shipment of the semen to another location;
H. Or other reasons deemed appropriate by my Doctor." (tr 108).
12

The contract did not state that any of the choices had to be signed, circled, checked
or initialed or otherwise indicate why Mr. Burns was having his semen cryopreserved.
At the time of Mr. Burns' signing this Semen Storage Agreement, he was told by
his doctor that he had a 95% chance of recovery. However, there was the chance with
irradiation and chemotherapy that he may be rendered sterile. At the time of signing of
the Agreement, this was the main reason for the collection of semen for cryopreservation.
The Semen Storage Agreement then goes on to state, "I understand that it is
impossible to determine with absolute certainty if my semen will freeze and thaw well
enough to contribute to a future pregnancy, (tr 109) (bold not in original).
And Section 3 B reads:
"The donor understands that the use of frozen-thawed sperm results
in a much lower chance of pregnancy compared to fresh sperm. It is
currently estimated that fresh sperm results in a three fold higher chance of
pregnancy compared to frozen-thawed sperm. Storage of 12-15 vials
should result in 4-6 months of trying to achieve pregnancy with
insemination. The donor understands that it is impossible to determine if a
given individual's semen will be able to result in a pregnancy even under
ideal conditions." (tr 109) (bold not in original).
Section M states:
Donor covenants and agrees, without a reservation of rights, in law
or equity, to indemnify, hold harmless and release the University and its
employees and agents...from any and all liability or obligation of any kind
or manner...connected with said procedures or related thereto...or in any
manner with, the offspring resulting from the artificial insemination
utilizing said semen samples and/or procedures connected therewith..." (tr
110) (bold not in original).

13

Of most import, Section I of the Semen Storage Agreement states in no uncertain
terms:
"In the event of the death of the donor the donor would like his
vials of semen (initial one of the items below):
a.

Destroyed

______

b.

Maintained in storage for future donation to Gayle Burns
(handwritten) (fill in name and relationship) who will assume
all of the obligations and terms described in this contract
MB . (Mr. Bums'initials) (bold not in original)

Thus, upon his death, Mr. Bums did gift these frozen vials of semen "for future
donation to [Appellant] Gayle Bums," for whatever uses she may see fit and as described
in the Contract, which would include "artificial insemination" and/or "contribution to a
future pregnancy," or creating "offspring resulting from the artificial insemination." This
contract was then dated and signed by the donor, Michael Bums, and the donor's wife,
Appellant Gayle Bums, and by a representative of the University of Utah Division of
Urology on May 30, 2000, as per U.C.A.§78B-15-704. ( t r i l l ) .
Unfortunately, Mr. Bums' condition then took a turn for the worse, and he passed
away unexpectedly on March 24, 2001 from Non Hodgkins Lymphoma and

(

chemotherapy, (tr 112).
It is Appellants' position that the numerous references to "artificial insemination"
throughout the Semen Storage Agreement clearly indicate Mr. Bums knew that these
frozen semen samples could be used to "contribute to a future pregnancy," (tr 108) and
A
14

create "offspring resulting from the artificial insemination/' (tr 110) and "trying to
achieve pregnancy with insemination," (tr 109) and "be able to result in a pregnancy." (tr
109).
The Agreement specifically refers to "in the event of the death of the donor, the
donor would like his vials of semen," "maintained in storage for future donation to Gayle
Burns, who will assume all of the obligations and terms described in this contract." (tr
109-10). Thus, "the deceased spouse [Mr. Burns] consented in a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after his death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child." UCA§78B-15-707.
Mr. and Mrs. Bums had only high hopes that Michael would beat this cancer with
the 95% success rate they were told. However, once the bad news was revealed to them,
they had no thoughts of the Semen Storage Agreement or future claims with Social
Security upon their minds. It was the furthest thought from the Burns' minds.
Under U.C.A §78B-15-201(2) Establishment of Parent-Child Relationship,
(2) The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child
by (e) the man having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under
Part 7, Assisted Reproduction which resulted in the birth of a child.
The Semen Storage Agreement was signed by both Mr. and Mrs. Burns pursuant to
§78B-15-704(1) "A consent to assisted reproduction by a married woman must be in a
record signed by the woman and her husband."
Mr. Burns provided sperm for, or consented to assisted reproduction by his wife as

15

necessary in §78B-15-704, and Mr. Bums is thus "the father of the resulting child bom to
his wife [Appellant]." U.C.A. §78B-15-703.
Argument II
If the Semen Storage Agreement was vague or ambiguous, the court must look for
any relevant evidence to determine whether Mr. Bums consented to the future birth of a
child after his death and have said child recognized as his own child and heir. "Utah law
does not strictly require courts to only view the terms of a contract within its four comers,
according to their plain meaning, when making the determination of whether there is an
ambiguity in a contract." Gilmore v. Macy, 121 P.3rd 57, 2005 Ut.App.351. "When
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered.
Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based

•

solely on the 'extrinsic evidence' of the judge's own linguistic education and experience."
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268, (UT 1995) (citations omitted).
See also, Nielson v. Gold's Gym. 78 P.3rd 600, 2003 UT 37, para 7, stating that
"[relevant], extrinsic evidence of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered
the contract is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the contract is

(

ambiguous. The judge should therefore consider any credible evidence offered to show
theparties' intentions."

•

There are numerous references in the record which clearly support that Mr. Bums
discussed this after-death birth scenario with his wife and his family. It was clearly his
i
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desire that Mrs. Burns have their child, even after his death.
Dr. James Heiner, M.D., of the Reproductive Care Center opined that based upon
the medical care and records of Appellant that it was "assur[ed] that Michael [Burns] was
the father." (tr 113). And the Administrative Law Judge at the Social Security level and
Judge Anthony B. Quinn determined that Appellant was not seeing anyone else, having
sexual relationships with anyone else, nor was there any other possible male party who
could have inseminated Ms. Burns a year prior to I.M.B.'s birth, (tr 171 para. 13, and
230).
Q (by Social Security ALJ) To the best of your recollection, at the
time that this semen sample was taken, had you or he discussed the
possibility that he would not survive the chemo and radiation, that he would
die and whether or not he wanted to leave you with a child that he was not
going to be able to support?
A (by Ms. Burns) We hadn't discussed it until we actually signed
this agreement where he had to notate what happened what happened [sic]
if he did die, what he wanted. And before we signed the agreement we
went home that night and had a discussion about if he did pass away he
wanted the sperm to go to me so that a piece of him would be be - - a piece
of him and I would be on the earth. He wanted me to have his kids.
Q So you did not sign that immediately when they presented you
with that option?
A No, we didn't.
Q Were you there with him when it was first presented to him, that
question?
A I was, yes.
Q

And the two of you wanted to go home and talk about it?
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A We did. Because of his survival rate, the 95 percent we hadn't
really even considered him not surviving, so that's the matter of discussion
that night.
Q And he decided he wanted a piece of him - - see, there are two
competing interests here, a piece of me going on or he's saddling you with a
burden that I can't help you support, two competing interests going on here

A

Right.

Q - - that needed to be resolved. And he resolved that to the best
of your recollection here, and I know you're not a disinterested party here.
A

Right.

Q To this conversation. To the best of your recollection he said
that he wanted a piece of him to go on even if he should die before the child
was conceived?
A

He did. He wanted a child of his on the earth.

Q The next day he signed that?
A He did. The next day he went in to do the deposit,
(tr 232-233).
Q (By attorney Hadley) And Ian [sic] [Michael] signed this on May
30, 2000 and he passed away on March 24, 2001. When did he actually get
worse where he started discussing this?
i

A (By Ms. Burns) He went through two rounds of chemo and we
had to go through a bone marrow transplant and at that point his chances
were 50/50 and we had to discuss more of what was going to happen if he
passed away.
Q

When approximately was that?

A That was, let's see, he went for bone marrow of 2000, December
of 2000, toward the end.
18
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Q Did either of you think about going back and looking at this
contract and making any changes on it that would indicate that the saved
sperm would be being used for artificial insemination?
A I don't think we thought about the agreement at that time
because it was quite a trying time for us. I think what we as lay people had
thought of as the agreement was that it would have taken care of it because
we didn't see any reason not to think it would.
Q So it was you and Michael's understanding that if he passed
away the contract that you'd signed seven months before gave you the right
to use that semen to impregnate yourself?
A
(tr236).

It was my understanding, yes, and Michael's.

Further, Elizabeth Park, the sister of the deceased and special administrator of his
estate, states that herself and Michael's three brothers recognize I.M.B. as their nephew,
and all of their children recognize him as their cousin, and Grandma and Grandpa Bums
recognized I.M.B. as their grandchild, (tr 172 para. 14 and 173 para. 7).
Further, Ms. Park states on the Social Security record that she discussed this with
her brother Michael, stating:
Q (By Attorney Hadley) Prior to your brother's death, did you ever
happen to have any conversations with him about this semen storage he had
with his wife?
A (Ms. Park) Yes, I did.
Q What was said?
A Well, he let me know that they were going to be storing his
semen and at that point it was for when he recovered. And we also talked
about if he happened to not recover what he would do and he talked about
having Gayle have his child after he died.
19

Q He wanted Gayle to have his child if he did not survive the
treatment and cancer?
A
(tr242).

Yes, he did.

Finally, Ms. Park was appointed special administrator of the estate of Michael
Burns on or about February 15, 2008 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 083900243. (tr 172 and Addendum). Said petition
was an Informal Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination of Heirs and
Appointment of Special Administrator. Ms. Park was appointed Special Administrator
(not in transcript but in Appellants' Addendum and supplied to Appellee's attorneys).
There was a finding that Mr. Bums died without a will and that Gayle Bums and I.M.B.
were his heirs.
.

i

Ms. Bums then filed a petition for determination of paternity In the Matter of
I.M.B. (DOB 12/23/03), a minor child, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case Number 074904953 before the Honorable Judge
Anthony B. Quinn. A hearing was scheduled for Tuesday, February 5, 2008 at 8:30 a.m.
Notice of the hearing and a certificate of mailing was accepted by Gayle Bums and

(

Elizabeth Park and mailed postage prepaid to the Social Security Administration, the
Honorable Donald R. Jensen (the Social Security Administrative Law Judge) and the
Utah Attorney General's office. In the Findings of Fact drafted after the hearing by this
counsel, it was found:
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"5.
That in personal conversations with his wife, Gayle Bums,
Michael A. Bums did express his desire to use his stored semen to have a
child in the future by artificial means if he was rendered sterile by the
treatments" (tr 151).
Under Conclusions of Law, it stated:
"5.
That the contract entered into by Michael A. Bums and the
University of Utah did give care, custody and control of the semen to Gayle
Bums for such fertilization purposes in the event of the death of Michael A.
Bums.
6.
That Michael A. Bums did discuss and intend for Gayle
Bums to use this semen for in vitro fertilization and such was discussed
between and agreed to by Gayle Bums and Michael A. Bums.
7.
That the minor child, [I.M.B.], has been recognized by
Michael A. Bums' family as the son of Michael A. Bums in all respects and
is openly acknowledged and recognized as the natural son of Michael A.
Bums.
8.
That petitioner has met their burden of proof. (Clear and
convincing, U.C.A. §78B-15-112.)
9.
That an appropriate Order consistent with these Findings
indicating the paternity and all rights arising therefrom of [I.M.B.] by
Michael A. Bums should be issued."
(tr 154).
An Order consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was signed
by Judge Quinn on April 15, 2008, stating:
"It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Michael
A. Bums, deceased, is the natural father of [I.M.B.], subject child of this
matter, bom on December 23,2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah to his natural
mother Gayle M. Bums.
That all rights arising from said parent/child relationship
including those of care, custody, support and inheritance are hereby
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granted for the benefit of [I.M.B.] a minor." (tr 155-156). (Bold not in
original.)
Thus, even if this court finds the Semen Storage Agreement vague or ambiguous,
there is enough extrinsic evidence including a Utah tribunal which supports the fact that
Mr. Bums contemplated, discussed and wished that a child being bom by artificial means
even after his death would be his own natural child and heir.
The Appellees have argued at the administrative level that the marriage terminated
upon the death of Mr. Bums and thus Appellants do not qualify for Social Security Rules.
However, U.C.A §78B-15-202 states:
"No Discrimination Based on Marital Status: A child bom to
parents who are not married to each other whose paternity has been
determined under this chapter has the same rights under the law as a child
bom to parents who are married to each other."
UTAH INTESTACY LAW
In the Bums' scenario an heir or interested person would file an Application for
Finding of Intestacy, Informal or Formal Appointment of Personal Representative or
Special Administrator, and Determination of Heirs. The appropriate person would sign
these documents under oath, submit it to the court, stating that the deceased died on
certain date in the state of Utah, in the appropriate county, that the deceased died intestate
(without a will or no known wills) and heirs and interested persons are listed with their
address and their relationship to the deceased, i.e., spouse, child, sister/daughter, and age.
This would be submitted to the registrar of the court. Appropriate Findings would be
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submitted to the registrar/clerk/judge of the court for their signature, and Findings would
be made stating that the application is appropriate in all respects, and that the heirs or
interested parties would receive notice of the hearing or waive such, and a personal
representative/special administrator would be appointed. A sample of such forms are
included in the Addendum.6
If there were questions about the rights of I.M.B. as a natural child, a birth
certificate listing his natural father could be submitted to the court. In addition, further
evidence to prove I.M.B. as an heir of Mr. Burns would be the Order of Judge Anthony
Quinn that I.M.B. is the child and heir of the deceased. This Order alone is enough of a
record to support the fact that Utah courts have recognized I.M.B. as the natural child and
an heir of the deceased Michael Bums, for intestacy purposes.
Under U.C.A. §78B-15-203, Consequences of Establishment of Parentage:
Unless parental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship established
under this chapter applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically
provided by other law of this state.
Mr. Burns' parental rights were never terminated over I.M.B. Thus, the Order
from Judge Quinn: "That all rights arising from said parent/child relationship, including
those of care, custody, support and inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of
I.M.B., a minor, (bold not in original) is controlling on heirship of I.M.B.

6

There are other intestate inheritance laws involving half children, grandparents,
cousins, brothers, sisters, etc., which are irrelevant to these arguments and are not
addressed in this brief.
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And under U.C.A. §75-2-103, Share of Heirs Other than the Surviving Spouse:
(1) Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving
spouse under Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no
surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals designated
below who survive the decedent.
(a) to the decedent's descendants per capita at each generation as
defined in Subsection 75-2-106(2).
The "decedent's descendant" would be I.M.B. if Mrs. Burns predeceased I.M.B.
Uniform Probate Code 75-2-106. Definitions-Per capita to each
generation-Terms in Governing Instruments.
(1) As used in this section

^

(b) "Surviving descendent" means a descendant who neither
predeceased the decedent nor is considered to have predeceased the
decedent under 75-2-104.
And U.C.A. §75-2-104, Requirement that heir survive decedent for 120 hours.
An individual who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is
considered to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead
allowance, exempt property, and intestate succession, and the decedent's
heirs are determined accordingly. It is not established by clear and
convincing evidence that an individual who would otherwise be an heir
survived the decedent by 120 hours, it is considered that the individual
failed to survive for the required period. This section is not to be applied if
its application would result in a taking of the intestate estate by the state
under Section 75-2-105.
U.C.A. §75-2-104 is generally used for simultaneous deaths if a common accident

<

(

{

killed several members of the same family and they die within a few days of each other.
There are special situations where family members will die within five days of each other
<
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and inheritance rights of heirs may be affected by this statute. This code section would
apply to such matters as homestead allowance and exempt property and distributive
provisions in certain types of trusts.
However, the next statute that comes into play is U.C.A. §75-2-108, Afterborn
heirs.
"An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that
time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth.
There is no Utah law regarding this matter. Nor is there any Utah definition of the
term "at a particular time." "At a particular time" can be interpreted in two ways.
First, the Utah legislature could have stated more specifically the clause to read:
"An individual in gestation [at the time of death of the deceased] is treated
as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth."
The legislature did not opt for such a particular and limiting clause.
As such, "at a particular time" could refer to time in the past or future and has no
specific spatial or time references and is a general and open term. There is no other
language in the Utah Probate Code or the Utah Code that states that it is required that a
posthumous child be in utero before the death of the deceased to be considered for a
particular title or right, i.e., heir or beneficiary of an estate, a trust, or life insurance
policy.
One scenario that could apply using U.C.A. §75-2-105 is that I.M.B. would be
entitled to a million-dollar distribution from a trust upon his birth. Should I.M.B. not live
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for five days after his birth, I.M.B. (or his heirs) would not be entitled to this milliondollar share of the trust, and such distribution would revert back to the trust.
This idea of a posthumous-born child is also addressed in the Utah Worker's
Compensation Act, U.C.A. 34A-2-403(l), which states:
"The following person shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for
support upon a deceased employee:
A. A child under 18 years of age;
(3) as used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act that the child includes (i) posthumous child.
Again, there is no requirement under this worker's compensation code that the child be in
utero at the time of death of the wage earner.
In a similar vein, U.C.A. §78B-15-702, Parental Status of a Donor states:
"A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction."
The purpose of this statute is to deny a non-spousal egg or sperm donor in a
Gestational Agreement (see U.C.A. §78B-15-801, et seq.) the parental rights of
inheritance, earnings and comfort of a child, and also eliminates that donor's duties of
support and care over said child. By reverse logic, these rights and duties and inheritance,
support and care of a natural child are strictly applied to an egg or a sperm donor who are
the natural father and mother of the child.
And referring to the Utah Rules of Construction under U.C.A. §68-3-2:
"The statutes establishing the laws of this state respecting the subject to
which they relate, and their provisions in all proceedings under them are to
be liberally construed with a view to affect the objects of the statutes and to
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promote justice."
The Utah Legislature has made provisions for after-bom children who are bom as
a result of assisted reproduction, and they have established such procedures in the Utah
Uniform Parentage Act and such statutes should be liberally construed in their
interpretation to protect the minor and their right to have a natural parent and have rights
of inheritance.
Further, to deny I.M.B. his surviving child's benefits is a violation of due process
under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution Art. XIV Sec. 1. The
method of conception through artificial insemination has created a whole new class of
children. This class of children should not be deprived of certain rights because they
were not conceived and bom in the "normal" or "accepted" manner of sexual intercourse.
XI
SUMMATION OF ARGUMENT
Medical technology has changed drastically over the years. It was inconceivable
when the Utah Uniform Probate Code was drawn up that there would be methods to
cryopreserve semen and eggs to create an embryo for implantation in a woman. Even
now, couples can create an embryo from their own semen and eggs and have another
woman carry and give birth to their natural children in gestational agreements.
Such scientific breakthroughs were only considered in the near past as science
fiction. Today such technology includes computers, e-mail and instant texting by cell
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phones. Such technology and the laws associated with these technologies are constantly
being addressed by courts and legislatures. Cyber bullying and sexting are just two
simple examples of our changing society that were not considered 10 years ago but are
now considered criminal acts.
Our legislature has seen fit to address the Bums' situation through the Utah
Uniform Parentage Act. Michael Bums, in the Semen Storage Agreement, agreed that in
the event of his death, his wife Gayle Bums would be the beneficiary of his frozen semen
to do with as she pleased, as per the terms of the Agreement. This included a future
pregnancy with offspring resulting from the artificial insemination. Mr. Bums, by his
signing the Semen Storage Agreement with his wife, did establish rights for any children
bom even at a later date, even after his death by the signing of this Agreement with his
wife. Further, if there is any question as to his intent, there is extrinsic evidence outside
the contract indicating that all of Mr. Bums' family have accepted I.M.B. as their cousin,
'i

niece and grandchild, and that specifically Michael Bums wished for he and his wife,
Gayle, to have a "child of his own on this earth."
Finally, Judge Anthony A. Quinn did make a finding of paternity that Michael A.

{

Bums was the natural father of I.M.B., and that I.M.B. was granted "all rights arising
from said parent/child relationship including those of care, custody, support and
inheritance...for the benefit of I.M.B., a minor."
The intent of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act has achieved its goal in this matter
i
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and this court should find that Michael A. Burns is the natural father of I.M.B., and that
I.M.B. has rights of inheritance under intestacy laws of the state of Utah and is a natural
dependent and heir of Michael A. Burns.
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§^8B-15-623

JUDICIAL CODE

raised and the tribunal adjudicates according to Part 6, Adjudication of Parent?e, and the final order:
•$*•
a) expressly identifies a child as a "child of the marriage," "issue of the
mam^ge," or similar words indicating that the husband is the father of the
child;
(b) p r o v e s for support of the child by the husband unless paternity is
specifically cradaimed in the order.
/f:'
..(4) The tribunal is not considered to have mptde-an adjudication of the
parentage of a child irSta child was born at the-lime of entry of the order and
other children are nam&d^as children of^the marriage, but that child is
specifically not named.
(5) Once the paternity of a chilcfha&been adjudicated, an individual who was
not a party to the paternity p r o c e ^ n ^ m a y not challenge the paternity, unless:
(a) the party seeking to#d&allengeS^an demonstrate a fraud upon the
tribunal;
J*'
(b) the challenger rail demonstrate by cle&rand convincing evidence that
the challenger did^ffot know about the adjudicatory proceeding or did not
have a reasonable*opportunity to know of the proceeding; and
(c) there wmild be harm to the child to leave the oro^r in place.
{6) A pa0y to an adjudication of paternity may challenge the adjudication
only unjj^r law of this state relating to appeal, vacation of ju&gpients, or other
judid^Q review.
l^ds 2008, c. 3, § 1443^ eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 637 of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

Prior Laws:
Laws 2005, c. 150, § 81.
n 1 Q C 7 fi ' ' .,. '
u l bi
* > * ™-45g-o2,3.

Xibrary References
Children Out-of-Wedlock <3=>64.
Westlaw Topic No. 76H.

CJ.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock §§ 121 to
122.

PART 7. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
. Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Caveat vendor:, Potential progeny, paternity,
and product liability. Dawn R. Swink, J. Brad
Reich, 2007 BYULR 857.
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§78B-15-703

UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT

§ 7 8 8 - 1 5 - 7 0 1 . Scope

f

This part does not apply to the birth of a child conceived by means of sexual
intercourse, or as result of a gestational agreement as provided in Part 8,
Gestational Agreement.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1444, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 701 of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

Prior Laws:
Laws 2005 c 150 § 82
'
'
K ' '
u l 6
^ ' 9 /«-4ig-/ul.

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity, and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 857
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink (2007).

§ 78B-15-702.

Parental status of donor

A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1445, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 702 of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

Prior Laws:
Laws 2005 c 150 § 83
1 Q -- R ' ' , - ' 7 n o '
L 1953 s
' '»-45g-702.

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity, and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 857
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink (2007).

§ 78B—15—703. Husband's paternity of child of assisted reproduction
If a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by his
wife as provided in Section 78B-15-704, he is the father of a resulting child
born to his wife.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1446, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 703 of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

Prior Laws:
Laws 2005 c 150 § 8 4
,un li Q6_- 9fi-L0' „c ' n^ '
^'
78-45g-/0J.

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity,
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink

and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 857
(2007).
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UTAH UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT

§788-15-707

Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 705 of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

Prior Laws:
Laws 2005, c. 150; § 86.
^
s 7Q_AQ« ink
r
u i y
V ' 8 /S-^g-/u:>. ....

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity,
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink

and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U..L. Rev. 857
(2007).

Library References
Children Out-of-Wedlock<3»15.
Westlaw Topic No. 76H.

§ 78B-15-706.

$

Effect of dissolution of marriage

(1) If a marriage is dissolved.before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo,
the former spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after a
divorce, the former spousevvotdd be a parentof the child.
(2) The consent of the foriner spouse to assisted reproduction may be
revoked by that individual in a record at any time before placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1449, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 706 of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.
,

PriorLaws:
Laws 2005, c. 150, § 87."
h 1QI - 7 A '''-,£ AC ™A
u iy!>
.^.?"•-. • _ :>g " / • "

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity,
and product liability online. Dawn fe. Swink

and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 857
(2007).

Library References
Children Out-of-Wedlock <3>15.
Westlaw Topic No. 76H.

§ 78B-15-707.

Parental status of deceased spouse

If a spouse dies before placement bf eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased
spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death,
the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1450, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
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§(18B-15-707
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Historical; and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
Prior Laws:
This section is similar to § 707 of the Uniform
1 flWo 2005 r 15fr- 6 ft*
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
r T J « V 7 ^ f ' JnJ
c iy53
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data' $ 78-45g-707. v
base on Westlaw.
Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity,
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink

and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 85
(2007).

Library References
Children Out-of-Wedlock <3»15.
Westlaw Topic No. 76H.

PART 8. GESTATIONAL AGREEMENT
78B-15-801.

Gestational agreement authorized

s

/

/

/

\jF%A prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married, a donor
or theaqnors,, and the intended parents may enter into a written agreement
providing th^tt:
(a) the prospective gestational mother agrees to pregnancy by means of
assisted reprodubtion;
(b) the prospective, gestational mother, her husband if she is married, and
the donors relinquish Ml rights a^
the parents of a child conceived
through assisted reprpd^tion; and
(c) the intended parents ^ecome thfe parents of the child.
(2) The intended gestational Mother may not currently be receiving Medicaid
or any other state assistance!;
j^
"'
(3) The intended parents shall be itiarried, and both spouses must be parties
to the gestational agreement,/'
V
(4) A gestational agreement is' enforceable only if validated as provided in
Section 78B-15-803. /
Nv
•

•

:

•

•

•

•

'

•)?'

\

*

(5) A gestational agreement does not apply to the^ birth of a child conceived
by means of sexual intercourseor if neither i n t ^ ^ d paj?e^ is; a donor.
(6) The partie|/tq a gestatipnal agreement sh^ll ^
(7) The gestational mother's eggs may n o t be used in^the^^dsted reproduction procedure.
^••.•.i->;v,,.---^^'
(S) If the gestational mother is married, her hiisbaiict's sperm may not be
used in tlie assisted reproduction procedure;
Laws # 0 8 , e. 3 , § 1451, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
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Library References
Children Out-of-Wedlock <3»20.2, 20.9.
Westlaw Topic No. 76H.
* C;j.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock §§ 37 to 38.

jir

Social Security number in tribunal records
The Social Security number of any individual who is subject to a paternity
determination shall be placed in the records relating-to the matter.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1381, eff. Feb. 7/20.08.
Prior Laws:
Laws 1997, c. 232, § 79.

Historical and Statutory Notes
..,*'"
Laws 2005, c. 150, § ,19.
f''
.
. & 1953^§§ 78-45a-11.5,78-45g-114.

§ 7 8 B - 1 5 - 1 1 5 . Settlement agreements
***
An agreement pJKsettlement with the alleged father is binding only when
approved by the^fribunaL
Laws 2008,JB^, § 1382, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
^
*
Historical and Statutory Notes
6r Laws:
Laws 1965, c. 158, § 13.

Laws 2005, c. 150, § 20.
C. 1953, §§ 78-45a-13, 78-45g-115.

PART 2. PARENT AND CHILD RELATIONSHIP
§ 78B-15-201.

Establishment of parent-child relationship

(1) The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and a
child by:
(a) the woman's having given birth to the child, except as otherwise
provided in Part 8, Gestational Agreement;
(b) an adjudication of the woman's maternity;
(c) adoption of the child by the woman; or
(d) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under Part 8, Gestational
Agreement, pris enforceable under other law.
(2) The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by:
(a) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity of the child under
Section 78B-15-204;
•(b) an effective declaration of piaternity by the man under Part 3, Voluntary
Declaration of Paternity, unless the declaration has been rescinded or successfully challenged;
(c) an adjudication pf the man's paternity;
(d) adoption of the child by the man;
716
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§ 78B-15-203

(e) the man having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under
Part 7, Assisted Reproduction, which resulted in the birth of the child; or
(f) an adjudication confirming the man as a parent of a child born to a
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under Part 8, Gestational
Agreement, or is enforceable under other law.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1383, eff. Feb. 7,2008.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 2 0 1 of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Wesdaw.
:

.: •••:
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• :.y
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Prior Laws:
Laws 2005, c 156, § 2 1
n 1 f l „ <* '_Q' .- ' o m
U l ^ J , S /8-4^g-2Ul.

. . . / •

•

,-.-,:..

^
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.; -^

y:--

-.

Notes of Decisions
In general

1
• .. ,..,•;. •;,.— ..-..•..

1 In general
'Supreme Court would decline to adopt a de
facto parent or psychological parent doctrine to
allow former domestic partner to seek visitation
with child who was born to other partner during parties' relationship; a de facto parent doctrine would not provide an identifiable jurisdic-

tional test that could be easily and uniformly
applied in all cases, adopting doctrine would
not be a natural development of the common
l a w feut r h e r
* : * legisktive act in derogation of
recognized common law principles and d o c
trine conflicted with state statutory law. Jones
v. Barlow, 2007, 154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv.
Rep. 20, 2007 UT 20. Children Out-of-wedlock
<§=* 20.9

§ 7 8 B - 1 5 - 2 0 2 . No discrimination based on marital status
A child born to parents who are not married to each other whose paternity
has been determined under this chapter has the same rights under the law as a
child born to parents who are married to each other.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1384, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 202 of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

Prior Laws:
Laws 2005, c. 150, § 22.
.n 1 Q t ., s '
nrn
u l*:>.*, s/«-4Sg-^u<>.

§ 78B—15—203. Consequences of establishment of parentage
Unless parental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship established
under this chapter applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically
provided by other law of this state.
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1385; efL Feb. 7, 2008. '

^-1

Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is identical to § 203 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B,
Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or
ULA Database on Westlaw.

^^

Prior Laws:
Laws 2005, c. 150, § 23.
r 1Q _- ~ ' fi .- ' 0 A 7
i~ i*w, 9 /s-4!>g-zuj.
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1

Rule 41

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

TITLE VI. CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER
BETWEEN COURTS
R U L E 4 1 . CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW BY UNITED
STATES COURTS
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court may
answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States
when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in accordance with the
provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding
before the certifying court is uncertain.
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court of the United States may invoke this rule
by entering an order of certification as described in this rule. When invoking
this rule, the certifying court may act either sua sponte or upon a motion by any
party.
(c) Certification order.
(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme Court and
shall state:
(c)(1)(A) the question of law to be answered;
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in a proceeding pending before the certifying court; and
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law.
(c)(2) The order shall also set forth all8 facts which are relevant to the
determination of the question certified and which show the nature of the
controversy, the context in which the questioii arose, and the procedural steps
by which the question was framed.
(c)(3) The certifying court may also include in the order any additional
reasons for its entry of the certification order that are not otherwise apparent.
(d) Form of certification order; submission of record. A certification order
shall be signed by the judge presiding over the proceeding giving rise to the
certification order and forwarded to the; Utah Supreme Court by the clerk of
the certifying coirrt under its official seal. The Supreme Court may require that
all or any portion of the record before the certifying court be filed with the
Supreme Court if the record or a portion thereof may be necessary in determining whether to accept the certified question or in answering that question. A
copy of the record certified by the cl^rk of the certifying court to conform to the
original may be substituted for the original as the record.
(e) Acceptance or rejection of certification. Upon filing of the certification
order and accompanying papers with the clerk, the Supreme Court shall
promptly enter an order either accepting or rejecting the question certified to it,
and the clerk shall serve copies of the order upon the certifying court and all
parties identified in the certification order. If the Supreme Court accepts the
question, the Court will set out in the order of acceptance (1) the specific
question or questions accepted, (2) the deadline for notifying the Supreme
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INTESTATE SUCCESSION & WILLS
In re Jones' Estate, 1940, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d
210. Taxation <S=> 856.1
Where claims against an intestate's estate
were never presented by creditors in probate
proceedings, administratrix did not, by paying
such claims, divest title to intestate's property
§ 75-2^-102.

§ 75-2-102
from intestate's heir, and hence transfer of
property to heir was subject to an inheritance
tax. Rev.St.1933, §§ 80-12-8, 101-4-2, 102-9-1,
102-9-2, 102-9-4. In re Jones' Estate, 1940, 99
Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210. Taxation ©=> 878(1)

Intestate share of spouse

(1) The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is:
(a) the entire intestate estate if:
(i) no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of
the surviving spouse; yjr.tfOQ
(b) the first $56T660, plus l/z of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or
more of the decedent's surviving descendants are not descendants of the
surviving spouse.
(2) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b), if the intestate estate passes to both the
decedent's surviving spouse and to other heirs, then any nonprobate transfer, as
defined in Section 75-2-206, received by the surviving spouse is chargeable
against the intestate share of the surviving spouse.
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 11, eff. July 1, 1998,
Uniform Law Comments
[UPC § 2-102]
Purpose and Scope of Revisions. This decedent's intestate estate when the estate
section is revised to give the surviving exceeds $150,000.
spouse a larger share than the pre-1990
If the decedent has other descendants,
UPC. If the decedent leaves no surviving the surviving spouse receives $100,000
descendants and no surviving parent or if plus one-half of the balance. In this type
the decedent does leave surviving descen- of case, the decedent's descendants who
dants but neither the decedent nor the are not descendants of the surviving
surviving spouse has other descendants, spouse are not natural objects of the bounthe surviving spouse is entitled to all of the ty of the surviving spouse.
decedent's intestate estate.
Note that in all the cases where the
If the decedent leaves no surviving de- surviving spouse receives a lump sum plus
scendants but does leave a surviving par- a fraction of the balance, the lump sums
ent, the decedent's surviving spouse re- must be understood to be in addition to
ceives the first $200,000 plus three-fourths the probate exemptions and allowances to
of the balance of the intestate estate.
which the surviving spouse is entitled unIf the decedent leaves surviving descen- der Part 4. These can add up to a minidants and if the surviving spouse (but not mum of $43,000.
the decedent) has other descendants, and
Under the pre-1900 Code, the decedent's
thus the decedent's descendants are un- surviving spouse received the entire inteslikely to be the exclusive beneficiaries of tate estate only if there were neither surthe surviving spouse's estate, the surviving viving descendants nor parents. If there
spouse receives the first $ 150,000 plus were surviving descendants, the descenone-half of the balance of the intestate dants to one-half of the balance of the
estate. The purpose is to assure the dece- estate in excess of $50,000 (for example,
Itlent's own descendants of a share in the $25,000 in a $100,000 estate). If there
43
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were no surviving descendants, but there
w a s a surviving parent or parents, the
parent or parents took that one-half of the
balance in excess of $50,000.
References. The theory of this section is
discussed in Waggoner, "The MultipleMarriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code,"
76 Iowa L.Rev. 223, 2:29-35 (1991).
Empirical studies support the increase
in the surviving spouse's intestate share,
reflected in the revisions of this section.
The studies have shown that testators in
smaller estates (which intestate estates
overwhelmingly tend to be) tend to devise
their entire estates to their surviving spouses, even w h e n the couple has children.
See C. Shammas, M. Salmon & M. Bahlin,
Inheritance in America from Colonial
Times to the Present 184-85 (J987); M.
Sussman, J. Cates & D. Smith, The Family
and Inheritance (1970); Browder, "Recent
Patterns of Testate Succession in the Unit-

ed States and E n g l a n d / ' 67 Mich. L. Rev.
1303, 1307-08 (1969); Dunham, "The
Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth
Transmission at Death," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev.
241, 252 (1963); Gibson, "Inheritance of
Community Property in Texas—A Need for
Reform," 47 Texas L. Rev. 359, 364-66
(1969); Price, "The Transmission of
Wealth at Death in a Community Property
Jurisdiction," 50 Wash. L. Rev. 277, 283,
311-17 (1975). See also Fellows, Simon
& Rau, "Public Attitudes About Property
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States," 1978
Am. B. F. Research J. 319, 355-68; Note,
"A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive
Preferences with selected Provisions of the
Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes," 63
Iowa L. Rev. 104i, 1091-92 (1978).
Cross Reference. See Section 2-802 for
the definition of spouse, which controls for
purposes of intestate succession.

Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
Prior Laws:
This section is similar to § 2-102 of the UniLaws 1988, c. 110.
form Probate Code (1990 Revision). See Volume
8, Pts. I, II, Uniform Laws Annotated, Master
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.
Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the
Nontraditional Family, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 93
(1996).

Descent and Distribution ^»52, 54.
Westlaw Key Number Searches:
124k54.

Library References
CJ.S. Descent and Distribution §§ 60, 63.
124k52;

Research References
Encyclopedias
Treatises and Practice Aids
14 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 755, Transfer of
Restatement (Third) Property (Wills & Don.
Assets in Fraud of Spouse's Antenuptial
Trans.) § 2.2, Intestate Share of Surviving
Contractual Rights.
Spouse.
^ ~~
Notes of Decisions
Plural wives 3
Postnuptial agreements

Constructive trusts 2
Conveyances antecedent to marriage 5
Death during pending divorce proceedings
Invalid divorce decrees 6
Nature of right 1
Partition actions 9
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Spouse omitted from will 4
1. Nature of right
Widow, electing to take her statutory onethird interest in husband's realty, takes not as
heir but in her own right. Staats v. Staats,
1924, 63 Utah 470, 226 P. 677. Descent And
Distribution @» 52(2)
2. Constructive trusts
Wife would be entitled to have constructive
trust imposed upon four gifts that intestate husband made to other relatives prior to his death,
if those gifts amounted to a substantial portion
of his property so as to violate husband's promise in postnuptial agreement to leave his estate
to his wife. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-101, 75-2-102.
Peirce v. Peirce, 2000, 994 P.2d 193, 386 Utah
Adv. Rep. 38, 2000 UT 7. Trusts <®=» 103(3)
3. Plural wives
A plural wife does not acquire the status of a
lawful wife, and is without the pale of the law of
inheritance as to any property which her husband has acquired previous to her marriage or
which he may thereafter acquire. Raleigh v.
Wells, 1905, 29 Utah 217, 81 P. 908, 110 Am.St.
Rep. 689. Descent And Distribution <S» 52(2)
4. Spouse omitted from will
Widow's intestate share as omitted spouse
under will executed by decedent during first
marriage was one half of decedent's estate.
U.C.A.1953, 75-2^-102(d). Matter of Estate of
Wagley, 1988, 760 P.2d 316. Descent And Distribution <3» 52(2)

§75-2-103
decrees which were void ab initio because of
other party's intervening death; statute could
not be applied to prevent wife whose husband
died during pendency of default divorce proceeding from inheriting from husband's estate.
U.C.A.1953, 75-2-803(2)(a). Farrell v. Porter,
1992, 830 P.2d 299. Descent And Distribution
«> 52(1); D i v o r c e d 169
7. Death during pending divorce proceedings
Where wife instituted action for divorce, obtained an interlocutory decree which was to
become final in three months and which awarded her home owned jointly by parties, and died
midway of three-month period, wife's executrix
could not be made the grantee. U.C.A.1953,
74-1-36; 74--4-2. Daly v. Daly, 1975, 533 P.2d
884. Divorce <3» 83
When death of one or both parties occurs
after entry of a divorce decree and before the
decree is final, the decree, including any determination of property rights^ becomes ineffective
and is deemed to be of no further force or
effect. Daly v. Daly, 1975, 533 P.2d 884. divorce <&* 83
Where wife, who instituted action for divorce
and obtained an interlocutory decree to become
final in three months, died midway of the threemonth period, it was improper to substitute
wife's executrix as party plaintiff. Daly v. Daly,
1975, 533 P.2d 884. Parties <S> 59(3)

5. Conveyances antecedent to marriage
Conveyance of property to trustee prior to
marriage operated to transfer property out of
settlor's estate so as to preclude property from
becoming part of estate at any time during
marriage even though settlor reserved right to
amend or to revoke trust. Horn v. First Sec.
Bank of Utah, N. A, 1976, 548 P.2d 1265.
Trusts <s=> 59(3)

8. Postnuptial agreements
Postnuptial agreement under which wife
agreed to give intestate husband all her future
paychecks in return for husband's promise to
leave his estate to her at his death, contained
implied restriction on husband's ability to give
away substantial portions of his estate during
his lifetime; otherwise, husband would essentially have given no consideration, and his
promise to leave estate to wife would be illusory. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-101, 75-2-102. Peirce v.
Peirce, 2000, 994 P2d 193, 386 Utah Adv; Rep.
38, 2000 UT 7. Husband And Wife; ®=» 30

6. Invalid divorce decrees
Utah statute regarding divorce decrees "not
recognized as valid in state," which purported
to prevent party who obtains or consents to
such a decree from claiming status of other
party's spouse following his or her death, applied only to invalid divorce decrees obtained
while other spouse was alive, not to divorce

9. Partition actions
Report of commissioner in partition and decree held to award title in fee to certain real
estate to the widow, by agreement, in place of
her life estate in an undivided quarter of all
decedent's lands under Comp. Laws 1876,
§ 703. Shaw v. Hays, 1915, 47 Utah 14, 151 P.
337. Dower And Curtesy <3=> 96

§ 75-2—103. Share of heirs other than surviving spouse
(1) Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving
spouse under Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no
surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals designated
below who survive the decedent:
45
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(a) to the decedent's descendants per capita at each generation as defined
in Subsection 75-2-106(2);
(b) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally if
both survive, or to the surviving parent;
(c) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the
decedent's parents or either of them per capita at each generation as defined
in Subsection 75-2-106(3);
(d) if there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent,
but the decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or descendants of
grandparents, half of the estate passes to the decedent's paternal grandparents equally if both survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to
the descendants of the decedent's paternal grandparents or either of them if
both are deceased, the descendants taking per capita at each generation as
defined in Subsection 75-2-106(3); and the other half passes to the decedent's maternal relatives in the same manner; but if there is no surviving
grandparent or descendant of a grandparent on either the paternal or the
maternal side, the entire estate passes to the decedent's relatives on the other
side in the same manner as the half.
(2) For purposes of Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d), any nonprobate transfer,
as defined in Section 75-2-205, received by an heir is chargeable against the
intestate share of such heir.
,
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 12, eff. July 1, 1998.

^

Uniform Law Comments
[UPC § 2-103]
This section provides for inheritance by necessary and confusing because the sysdescendants of the decedent, parents and tern of representation in Section 2-106
their descendants, and grandparents and gives equal shares if the decedent's decollateral relatives descended from grand- scendants are all of the same degree of
parents; in line with modern policy, it k insn ip to the decedent,
eliminates more remote relatives tracing
^
, „,
,
„
.
.,
The w o r d
through great-grandparents.
descendants replaces the
Purpose and Scope of Revisions. The word "issue" in this section and throughrevisions are stylistic and clarifying, not o u t ^ revisions of Article II. The term
substantive. The pre-1990 version of this l s s u e 1S a t e r m o f a r t h a v m g a biological
section contained the phrase "if they are connotation. Now that inheritance rights,
all of the same degree of kinship to the in certain cases, are extended to adopted
decedent they take equally (etc.)." That children, the term descendants is a more
language has been removed. It was un- appropriate term.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 2-103 of the Uniform Probate Code (1990 Revision). See Volume
8, Pts. I, II, Uniform Laws Annotated, Master
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

Prior Laws:
Laws 1992, c. 30.
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§ 75-2-104

Library References
Descent and Distribution @»25 to 43.
CJ.S. Descent and Distribution §§ 27 to 29,
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 124k25 to
32 to 49.
124k43.
Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Restatement (Second) of Property, Don.
Trans. § 28.2, Class Gift to "Issue" or "Descendants".
Restatement (Third) Property (Wills &. Don.
Trans.)L§ 2.3, Intestate Share of Surviving
Descendants.

Restatement (Third) Property (Wills & Don.
Trans.) § 2.4, Intestate Share of Surviving
Ancestors and Collateral Relatives.

Motes of Decisions
In general 1
Kindred of half-blood 2
Siblings and their descendants
1. In general
Where deceased left surviving him only
grandfather on maternal side and three aunts
on paternal side, grandfather succeeded to deceased's property as sole heir. Reed v. Knudson, 1932, 80 Utah 428, 15 P.2d 347. Descent
And Distribution fc» 36
2. Kindred of half-blood
Under Comp. Laws, § 2749, providing that
kindred of the half blood inherit equally with
those of the whole blood, unless the inheritance
come to the intestate by descent from some one
of his ancestors, in which case all those who are
not of the blood of such ancestor must be excluded, children of deceased's husband by a
former wife cannot inherit from deceased an
estate acquired by descent. Amy v. Amy, 1895,
12 Utah 278, 42 P. 1121, affirmed 18 S.Ct. 802,

§ 75-2-104.

171 U.S. 179, 43 L.Ed. 127, Descent And Distribution G» 33
3. Siblings and their descendants
Decedent's brothers and sisters were hot his
"heirs" as defined in Uniform Probate Code and
thus could not assert claims under wrongful
death statute.
U.C.A.1953, 75-1-201(17),
75-2-103, 78-11-7. Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 1989, 784 P.2d 1152. D e a t h s 31(5)
Under amended succession statute, children
and grandchildren of deceased brother or sister
stand in place of their1 predeceased parents and
take on a representative basis regardless of
whether any brother or sister of deceased is still
living. U.C.A.1943, 101-4-5. In re Yonk's Estate, 1949, 115 Utah 292, 204 P.2d 452. Descent And Distribution @» 34
Where a mother having children as the issue
of two marriages died after inheriting property
from a deceased son, such property was distributed among his surviving brothers and sisters
and their descendants of both the whole and the
half blood, under Comp. Laws 1907, § 2840.
Gardner's Estate v. Gardner, 1912, 42 Utah 40,
129 P. 360. Descent And Distribution <®» 33

Requirement that heir survive decedent for 120 hours

An individual who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is considered to
have predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt
property, and intestate succession, and the decedent's heirs are determined
accordingly. If it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that aii
individual who would otherwise be an heir survived the decedent by 120 hours,
it is considered that the individual failed to survive for the required period.
This section is not to be applied if its application would result.in a taking of
intestate estate by the state under Section 75-2-105.
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 13, eff. July 1, 1998.
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(a) "Deceased descendant," "deceased parent," or "deceased grandparent" means a descendant, parent, or grandparent who either predeceased the
decedent or is considered to have predeceased the decedent under Section
75-2-104.
(b) "Surviving descendant" means a descendant who neither predeceased
the decedent nor is considered to have predeceased the decedent under
Section 75-2-104.
(2)(a) If, under Subsection 75-2-103(l)(a), a decedent's intestate estate or a
part thereof passes "per capita at each generation" to the decedent's descendants, the estate or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares as there
are:
(i) surviving descendants in the generation nearest to the decedent which
contains one or more surviving descendants; and
(ii) deceased descendants in the same generation who left surviving
descendants, if any.
(b) Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is allocated one
share.
(c) The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the
same manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants
as if the surviving descendants who were allocated a share and their surviving descendants had predeceased the decedent.
(3)(a) If, under Subsection 75-2-103(l)(c) or (d), a decedent's intestate estate
or a part thereof passes "per capita at each generation" to the descendants of
the decedent's deceased parents or either of them or to the descendants of the
decedent's deceased paternal or maternal grandparents or either of them, the
estate or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares' as there are:
(i) surviving descendants in the generation nearest the deceased parents
or either of them, or the deceased grandparents or either of them, that
contains one or more surviving descendants; and
(ii) deceased descendants in the same generation who left surviving
descendants, if any.
(b) Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is allocated one
share.
(c) The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the
same manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants
as if the surviving descendants who were allocated a share and their surviving descendants had predeceased the decedent.
(4) Any reference to this section found in a governing instrument for the
definitions of "per stirpes," "by representation," or "by right of representation"
shall be considered a reference to Section 75-2-709.
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 15, eff. July 1, 1998.
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INTESTATE SUCCESSION & WILLS
§ 75-2^107.

§ 75-2-108

Kindred of half blood

Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they
were of the whole blood.
Laws 1975, c. 150, § 3.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 2-107 of the Uniform Probate Code (1990 Revision). See Volume

8, Pts. I, II, Uniform Laws Annotated, Master
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

Library References
Descent and Distribution @»35, 41.
Westlaw Key Number Searches:
124k41.

C.J.S. Descent and Distribution §§ 29, 42, 46.
124k35;

•_.
"
Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Restatement (Third) Property (Wills & Don.
Trans.) § 2.4, Intestate Share of Surviving
Ancestors and Collateral Relatives.
Notes of Decisions
In general 1
from
a deceased son, such property was distributed among his surviving brothers and sisters
t
and their descendants of both the whole and the
1. In general
half blood, under Comp. Laws 1907, § 2840.
Where a mother haying children as the issue Gardner's Estate v. Gardner, 1912, 42 Utah 40,
of two marriages died after inheriting property
129 P. 360. Descent And Distribution @» 33

§ 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 8 . Afterborn heirs
An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time
if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth.
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 16, eff. July 1, 1998.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
Prior Laws:
This section is similar to § 2-108 of the UniLaws 1975, c. 150.
form Probate Code (1990 Revision). See Volume
8, Pts. I, II, Uniform Laws Annotated, Master
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.
Library References
Descent and Distribution @=>27.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 124k27.
C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 34.

Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Restatement (Second) of Property, Don.
Trans. § 26.1, Gifts Immediate in Form to
Class-When Class Closes to After-Conceived
and After-Adopted Persons.

Restatement (Third) Property (Wills & Don.
Trans.) § 2.1, General Principles and Definitions.
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UNIVERSITY OF UTABSCHOOL OFMEDICINE,
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH'
DIVISION OF UROLOGY

SEMEN STORAGE AGREEMENT
The purpose oftht document it to act man agreementto store semenfor thepurpase ofshortand/or long
arrtjta^faJfrwM^
end between the University of Utah School ofMeaJdne, Division of Urology, Salt Lake Oty, Utah, hereinafter
ujmetbnes referred to as »n. rTnhenkj," and $Q\A&- ^^\ whose address is kereafia'ehen and who is
umetimssreferredtoas the "Donor".

J.

1.'
3.

• ' . : ^ V . •.;,:••••••
AGREEMENT
..'.'•'•'."'-':/•
The Donor has consulted frith a doctor and it has been determined that the
Dotior may be an appropriate candidate to have his semen collected, evaluated, frozen and storedfor his
future use or otherpossible uses as hereinafter setforth. Semen is desired by the donorfor one or more of
Aefollowing reasons:
A* .. Prior to vasectomy;
ftp
Pruir toinadiation and/or chemotherapy;.
C
Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications;
. D. • Priorto exposuretopotentially toxkenytcmmentalcondkions;
E.
Prior to travel or extended abseme of the donor;
F.
Prior to ardficMmsembwdon;
CI *. Priorto shipmentof'the semen to anotherlocation;
H. .• . Or other reasons deemed'appropriate by my Doctor.
I hereby request that the University of Utah store my semen by cryopreservadon (storage in liquid
nitrogen).
1 (donor) understand and agreetothe follower
A*
To have a current semen analysis of my semen by the University of Utah Andrology laboratory to
determine if my semen quaBty n sujfichrtto consider prsservotion byfr^
'•• besentto the Donor or DonorsDoctor evaluatingdie quality of the semen. 1 under stand that it is
impossible to determine with absolute catainty if n^ semen wiUfreeze and tkxiwweUtnouzh to
''contributed
Jifuto^
- theuxhnujueofjreetfngan^
iriEbetiscouragedjromcryop^
ha dates will befoOoyved by the Um^ty
.
cryopreser^ationisunlikefytortsuhinviabksp^

, .A

.^ . ^ e j t o f c ^ / W a *

^*WWafrca«^>z£n/roin^ricm«fsample.

CVLirnrp ( ^

«* ^ ^

£?

thsuggestodthatatleast

12-15 viah befrozenfor long term storage. The donor understands that

ihauuoffroten^hawed

sperm results m

tparm Hkatrrertfy estimated
cownpasrt tofrazen&awed sperm. Storage of 12-15 HaJsshouU result in 4-6months of trying to
ackk^pregnancy wail btseminations. The donor understands that tkbupcssU
dgi^enincSviduaTs semen lrfB be vote to mult in a pregnancy evm under ideal coruSthns. The
moTerkbthatare stored the higher me d

able to eventualfy result m a

pregnancy
£olboj^
Tlu storage of any semmsam^pla
six month period the egresmentshaU be automatical^

Attheendqfthe
•

assuming aUqfthe obligations have been met as contained herein, and untU terminatedpursuant
to the provisions cf this agreement
The donor agreas to pay aU costs aucciatedwim
of his soman. ThesechargeswO be billed m aa\anc*f<>r thefoBowing six~monlh period In the
eimtt that th* agreement b automatical^ renewed fa
- fee for ***** sample heldmfrozen storage by the .University. Currently the fee for a semen analysis
b$70; the costforfreezingis 170 andthe costforfreezing and ttsUthaw is 17Qt The cost for long
'

term storage is currently MJS/vud/monm or a minimum charge of $&S/year.
TheDonorunderstandsthatthe University has we right to mcrease any of me abovefees without
prior notice to the Donor.
Any chargefor storageshall be paid wWrii thirty (SO) days of the data ofbilling, otherwise such
charges shall be deemed deUnauent
The Unhershy' shall release the rialfs) of Donor's frozen semen only upon written notice by the
Donor and onty to a UcensedmeaYcal doctor or autho
and upon compliance with reasonableprocedures and policies which the University may from time
to time establish, mcJudfog pcymsnt ofa shlpjmgajid/or transfer fee.
. This agreementska&termmae, and the University's responsibilityfor storage shall cease, upon the
occurrence of one or more of'thefqUowing events:
(a)
ReleasefofaUthe semen samples according to me terms ofthis agreement andpayment of
theappQcable transferfee;
. . .
(b)

. fc)

Written direction by the Donor to the- University authorizing destruction of all semen
samples retained in storage;
The Donor's death;

(d)
(e/

Failure of the Donor topay storage charges within thetimeprovided in paragraph 3(F);_ Upon thirty (30) days writUn notification by the Universal
mleniiohto-discontm

•• intlu event oftho death of the donorthe donor would Oke his vials Ofsemen{mltialant ofJh* items
below):.
A

Destroyed

'* ' •

.*.

Hcintamedm storageforfuture donation to

£AfL*

£(/&*(,

ffWmnnm*

71
.Vj^**^*****^'*

JC

^

^

^

^

^

^

r-M «ii**w»."««V"--»

^
^
toH*~±d

'

^
^
^
^
ofloss, damage or destruction duringtkt

"rZZ^IZZZXZttZ*-**"'?*
2^i^^.^&-*-**-'--*^ f c - , , r .
hi

SSITSX-*-^-^--^^.^
*11LTJZZ£ZO»«,^*'^''M<*" im**.*-?*
,

ZE£ZZZ^">^*~*y*''.''"lZ

N.

.SE^ZwN-*«**«—•-•
tod- * • B— /- d^ r
^^l!L*«*«^»^^»'^ ~™ ^^ "
LMh^**xbri

at the rmbr count ofmail by the Donor.

SlrZZZZ^^
^ ^ t t ^ - ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

. V^'j^^^
iTpZ^f^Uni^. *»~*D~*n^»«^^"**nuaUrcctMeiuleckncwUdgedbyth^

• * . , _ _ . . .

a m * * api********^^'^*'*^
****!*•
TkhagtumantskaSLbebindbig upon the administrators, heirs and successors ofth* partus
,Aflfl becoMtoUdi b> andconstr m

K.

iw, ta»»^ «r -a *««« -**« *<*<"' *«"*

'

(j?U

aoeordancewiththelamcftheSteUojf'XJtttn^
MtheTUrdJnilcialDistrkXQ
Tin egreawwit represents the entfr
agiemmUSp or representations other than at set forth herein. Theprintedportion ofthis contract
b*m contract bammduDon*
Unbcrsky. Crossomts, written adautons, notes or otherwise
do not otter or become part of this contract Written date and signatures do become part of this

IN WITNESS WBEREOF, the 'parties hereto hdn effixedtheirhands andseals this JL2L2 **?

Sfyfaet"*"!*''*. ™//fJrl/L--,
'FE (sign***)

f\\CMtK£L A.

W&rS

DONOR (phase print)

Mft

i-

ADDRESS

P?>U<r\ <?[.
<tC

(*o\)

yr

^fl{5.

Htyyzt

TELEPHONENUMBER
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, DIVISION
OF UROLOGY

•<.ftdfrADDRESS "

:

~"
R*K0497
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Utah Marriage Certification

A u g u s t 2 4 , 1997
Date o f Marriage

1997026627
F i l e Number

M i c h a e l A Burns
Name o f Groom

22
Age of Groom

Gayle L Berry
Name o f Bride

25
Age of B r i d e

S a l t Lake
County of Issuance
A u g u s t 2 7 , 2004
Date Issued

The original document, of which this is k
photocopy, appears to be genuine anti
unaltered and to have been made attht
time purported.
f
This photocopy consists of (_

il'

SignatureC^J^^^s^sisiSStr
Date.

meJ&Lzz~

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
VITAL RECORDS & STATISTICS
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

This is to certify that this is a true copy of the certificate on file in this office. This certified copy is issued
under authority of section 26-2-22 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 As Amended.

O OAXA-J £

/)&w0t6u

Barry E. Nangle
DIRECTOR OF VITAL RECORDS

University of Utah School of Medicine
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jglasTXarrell,Ph.D.,H.C.LD.
•ctor

Irologyand
Laboratories

April 10, 2003

RE: Gayle Bums (spouse Michael)
/

Dr* Heiner,
Enclosed is the summary of the pre-freeze motility for vials cryopreserved for Michael
Burns for the date sent. Gayle has had four inseminations with Tina Goldsmith, under the
rection of Dr. Jeffrey Quinn, using-.one vial for each attempt.
Also enclosed is a copy of the recommended thawing protocol for vials frozen at the
University of Utah Andrology Laboratory.
The following vials have been sent to your facility:
Patient name
Michael Burns

# vials
5

date
6/1/2000

Thank you for your time and attention for this patient. If you have any questions or need
istance, please let me know.
•
any assistance

i

- oincerely,

QffiSA^1Debbie Cartmill, M.S., T.S.
Andrology Program Manager
University of Utah School of Medicine
The original document, ot which tnis m ptotocopy, appears to be genuine at*
unaltered and to have been made at tto
time purported.
This photocopy consists of f
Signatufi
675 Arapeen Orivc
Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
(801)581-3740
FAX (801) 581*6127

\jz#jat Tttte

'>*teSL

*$L

Reproductive Care Center
1220 East 3900 South, Suite 4-G, Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Phone (801) 268-0306 Fax (801) 268-6234 •

8-18-04
Re:

Gayle Burns

To Whom It May Concern:
The Reproductive Care Center used spermfromMichael Burns sent to us from the
University of Utah to inseminate the eggs of Gayle Burns to create 9 embryos, two of
which were transferred to Gayle on 5/3/03, and 7 of which were frozen for possible later
use. Attached is a copy of the letterfromUniversity of Utah regarding Michael's sperm.
Gayle subsequently delivered a baby boy on December 23,2003, approximately four
weeks prior to her normal due date, assuring that Michael was the father.
If you have any questions in this regard, please do no hesitate to call*
Sincerely,

The original document, of which this is a
photocopy, appears to be genuine and
unaltered and to have been made at the
time purported.
This photocopy consists of.
Signature
OateS^flSt Title

&L-~-

University of Utah School of Medicine

;•

Douglas T. Carrell, Ph.D., H.C.LD.
Director
Andrologyand
.
IVF Laboratories

August 5,2004

RE: Gayle Bums
To Whom It May Concern:
I have been asked by Mrs Gayle Burns to write the followingletter. In April of 2000 her
husband, Michael Burns was diagnosed with cancer. As part of his therapy, his doctor suggested
that he have sperm cryopreserved. Mr. Burns had sperm cryopreserved at our laboratory, and as
part of the process filled out a consent/storage contract. That contract has a legal clause asking
the depositor to indicate what action should be taken with the semen in the event of his death.
Mr* Burns indicated that he would like the sample legally transferred to his wife, Gayle Burns.
Following the passing of Mr. Burns, Gayle worked with Dr. James Heiner to undergo fertility
treatments using the previously cryopreserved sperm. Our laboratory released the sperm to Gayle
Burns for her treatment under Dr. Heiners care. If you have further questions please feel free to
contact me.

Sincerely,

Douglas ft Carrell, Ph.D., H.C.L.D.
Dougla
Associate Professor of Surgery(Urology), GB/GYN and Physiology
Director of Andrology and IVF Laboratories
University of Utah School of Medicine
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
(801)581-3740
DTC/vsf
The original document, of which this m *
photocopy, appears to be genuine ant:
unaltered and to have been made at the
time purported.
This photocopy consists o f _ ( _ pages
675 Arapeen Drive
Salt Lake City Utah 84108
(801)581-3740
FAX (801) 581-6127

*gnatu«£lltffo?<r^^
^^^pt^jj^t

Title

^ ^
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UN 115--15

Container
Of sterile
D sterile w/media Male
D SCD
Female
D other

D pre-IVF

Vials Frozen:

0 STS (Short Term Storage)

Destination:

JiC LTS (Long Term Storage)

D other

INITIAL

iple' ^'ized: D fresh D frozen
Bgi
etration
mber of eggs tested
Tiber of eggs penetrated
nber of sperm on egg surface
*rm penetrations per egg

ume: ^

xtial i S L

mL by
mL by
mL by

rial
jred Viscosity or Agglutination
•nments:

Burns, Gayle Lisa

6/13/71

Douglas T. Carrell PhJ3.
. ' . . . • ' .

^

bv "TH*-

'. -.'.-.

- ' •

Test Thaw Date

• (attach supporting paperwork)

NORMAL
>15%
>20

D other
Control Value

>3
>1
1

%

by

-mmmmsEBsmm
INITIAL

Progressive Motility:
Motility Score:
Concentration:
Total Progressively Motile:

FINAL

^hi

. %

3C±\

.million/mL
million

llMMIIUIMILIUJJiigiBar

[MtMliLC^Il!

TAILS:
normal
no tail
short tail
coiled tail
bent tail
two tails
midpiece defect

NORMAL
>55%
< 5%

:AD$Tie
e
ill
*red
mature
licate
arphous

(dob)

Q University Lab J4teiversity LTS Facility

AFTER ENHANCEMENT

amorphous peroxidase+
. cells/hpf
. cells/hpf
. cells/hpf

•

7/23/75

Enhancement: Q refrigeration D ionophore

gw

lib

Burns, Michael

Consulting Physician

33I3SSU
0 Cervical Mucus Interaction

Sperm Storage:

vim 7 6

Last Name, First Name

Referring Physician

3 collected (if different)
iments
HEPT

foyfaUwBurtw

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURES FORM

Collection Site
$UofU
D comm lab
D home
• other

tal Abstinence
- ? ^ days
3 received

—'•siourns

W l I W l % I

University of Utah School of Medicine
50 N. Medical Dr. Suite 3B208 - Salt Lake City; UT 84132 • (801) 581-3740

m

fiH-QP

fr*#-lfc*"WI

m xv#i-»ww i

"^v

< 5%
<25%
<15%
< 5%
<10%

NORMAL
>65%

Initial motility: i ^ 2 _
motility:,
motility:,
motility:.
motility:,
motility:,
motility:.
motility:.

(4) H \
.(4)
.(4)
.(4)
(4)
.(4)
(4)
(4)

(2) \V>
.(3)
.(3)
.(3)
.(3)
.(3)
.(3)
.(3)

HUSBAND

DONOR

Initial

(2) <Q
.(2)
.(2)
.(2)
.(2)
.(2)
.(2)
.(2)

NORMAL
> 40%/1:100

30 minutes

40%/1:10

60 minutes

> 35%/1:20

90 minutes

> 30%/1:20

comments _

.by.

iments _

(% Progressive Motility / Concentration)

rt)

.(D
.0)
.(D
.(D
.0)
.(D
.0)

I V

(0). concentration - 1 : 4 - ° °
. (0), concentration - 1
. (0), concentration - 1
. (0), concentration - 1
,(0), concentration-1
. (0), concentration - 1
. (0), concentration - 1
. (0), concentration - 1

by__

.

byJJjL
b y _
by
by
by
b y _
b y _
b y _

•jew ami R^kase

TS>

P.nmmonk

(J\8

Michael and Gayle Lisa Burns (00-153-016) *
June 7,2000

*
•

cc: Patient
;

The copy of the June 1* sperm freezing and storage results indicates a normal sperm motility and
concentration prior to freezing. Nine vials werefrozenfromthis sample.
Sincerely,
DICTATED BY CHARLES CORNWELL
AND MAILED WITHOUT SIGNATURE
IN HIS ABSENCE TO AVOID DELAY

Charles E. Cornwell, MT, BS
for
Douglas T. Carrell, Ph.D., H.C.L.D.
Assistant Professor of Surgery(Urology), Physiolojgy and Ob-Gyn
Director of Andrology and IVF Laboratories
Division of Urology
University of Utah School of Medicine
Salt Lake City, UT 84132
(801)581-3740
CECVjir

The original document, ot which this i%
photocopy, appears to be genuine art
unaltered and to have been made at tfv
time purported.
This photocopy consists of_2L~page&

S^nm(^?^^^t3t^^^L,
DeX%3feh£trtte
'Mffi<
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18-1366

LOCAL FLE NUMBER
EOF DECEDENT

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

MJCHAEL AARON

Hale

BURNS

25

July 23, 1975
ami

'

\QZBUQ**W

Salt Lake City, Utah

ID J.Otmftfmd^^
S.tt**igHoiM

•s.DQA

,

University Hospital

Cavle Berry

Salt Lake

^SS^SOT-W8**-*'*

11. MARITAL STATUS
|Ql.|la*erM«rkjdO

HzM-nMd

Ql.Y«|3aLNo
13*.
RESIOENCC - STREET AND NUMBER

Bl.Y*i

•

84115

Q

t. Marten

Q

3. Puerto Wean Q

Q

1.YM

[xJlNo

2, Cuban

13d STATE

Salt Lake

Salt Lake City

I d WAS DECEDENT OF HISPANIC ORIGIN?
(UyiSpmdfy)

QJ.NO

ARUF/Medical
13C COUNTY

LCftY* TOWN OR COMMUNITY

1499 South Roberta Street
13*. INSIDE crnr 13f.SPCODE
UMJT37

12b. KIND OF BU5IC8S OR W0U5TRY

Phlebotomiet

Q<

1 529-49-0701

|aSURVtVWOBPOUSEflrt*«k.ttV«/MtoM«m»;

ft* COUNTY OF DEATH

Salt Lake City

"ttn

Q l

,fj

8C CITY, TOWN. OR LOCATION OF DEATH
DECEDENT

log?

Bb. NAME OF HOSPITAL NURStNO HOME OR OTHER FAOUTY
Of otftUt a ttdkr, « * • abaat « * * • * * of fecaftnj

Ba. PLACE | HOaPrTALftMwiPHi.»r»>^^ir»f'AU.OTHEft LOCATIONS:

°^J«,KH*-*«

March 2 4 , 2001

8. BIRTHPLACE (C*> ft Slofcorftoftjton CMM»y) 17. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

S.AGE-

4. DATE OF BIRTH (kkx. Oay. Yr.)

STATE F W NUMBER

3ft. DATE OF OEATH (Ma, Oaf. WJ 3b. TiJlE OF DEATH (Mr. doc*)

2. SEX

LAST

FOIST

d Other <Spedry)_

Utah

IS. EDUCATIONtaaceVor* ftfenesf
gndaeamplaiMS) Eiamanlaryor
Sacondvy (M2)Co8ipa ( I M S
or 17*)

IS. RACE -Blec*, WNta, Am.
'
may be era
MSotdryj

16

Caucasian
16. MAIDEN NAME OF MOTHER fflfat ft

17. FATHERS NAME (Hrtt, A****. U*0

William Dewey Burns

Louise Goates

19. NAME, RELATK3NSWP AND MAILING A0DRES8 OF INFORMANT
INFORMANT

WIFE:

Gayle Burns / 1499 South Roberta Street / Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
21a. DATE OF DISPOSITION 31b, PLACE OF DISPOSmON (nameof cwmr*r. |21«. LOCATION -C*r or Town, State
Cftfiiajuty, ttrovtafplaoa)

20. METNOO OF DISPOSITION

i

DISPOSITION | g d Burial

QtCratMlionQs.

•yiPMAJURE OF FUNER^LSERWCE UCEN8EE

I

j

24. FUNERAL HOME (Nairn andaddnua)

23. LICENSEE NUMBER

95-270363

Larkin Mortuary
TS-TST 260 E. South Temple
SLC Utah 84111

ISXJATE DECEASEfrWAStAST
128. fc^WBad
If ye*, anloritt data end Itor reported
/TATTOOED BY CCRTIFYINO PHYSICIAN
M.E.CASENO.

March 2 4 , 2001
27i CERTIFIER

CERTIFIER

HR_

'

] Q

1. CERTIFYING PHYSICIAN:

O

2. MEDICAL E^INERflAWENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL: Ontobeekof BxamlmrtJanentfD/lnMai^

w

TotebealofairlirwiieidBa, o a ^

CO

lima, da**, p»aca end dm to the
27d DATE SIGNED fMorWh. Day, Year)

Vc LICENSE NUMBER

27b. 8IONATURE AND TITLE OF

/£.

P

Salt Lake City, Utah

March 27, 20011 Larkin Sunset Lawn

|QtErt*ntam«*Q2.DonatW Q ' j .

h*£>*

88-178621-1205

March 2 8 . 2001

28.LNAOTANOA
NAGANO ADORES8 OF PERSON^HO CERTIFIED THE CAUSE OF DEATH (lam 31) (TfraPrint)

John R. Michael, M* D» 50 N Medical Drive. Salt Lake City. Utah
28. REGISTRARS SIGNA1
REGISTRAR

/&A& 6PI
31. PART L ENTER THE DISEASES.
OR RESPIRATORY

84132
30b. DATE FILED {Mfc, Of* w\)

Mar. 27, 2 0 0 f March 29, 2001

ION8 THAT CAUSED THE DEATH DO NOT ENTER THE MODE OF DYING, SUCH AS CARDIAC I
FAdURE. LIST ONLY ONE CAUSE ON EACH LINE.
ISefwoofi Oruof end
9th.

IMMEDIATE CAUSE (Final
dfaMM or condition nauHktg
Ai death)

*J/

&g

us*-/

ty/fty»w

OUE TO (OR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF):

Sequentially Hst conditions, If
any, leading to
cau*e. Enter UNOERLYINQ
CAUSE (disease or Injury that
Initiated events resuMM In
death) LAST

DUE TO (OR A8 A CONSEQUENCE Of*
DUE TO (OR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF):

PART Ik Oth* Slgnafcont CpnaTMont cowfjuUnt >o deett 3?. M YOUR OPINION. TOBACCO U«E P Y THE r^CEPEHT:
|33a.VMRAHAVtOP3Y Mb. WERE AUTOPSY
butnM reeuBJng n me underlying came given hip«t I
FMWQS AVAILABLE
Ql.ProbtiNVCMlrtMltfdtol^oauMofitaMv
[ [ ] s . NOW USER
PRIOR TO COMPLETION
/ / P A HneUlCmi
LMfrkUvr*^ Q z W M iha undMtrmo C M * of dwth.
OF CAUSE OF DEATH?

CAUSE OF
DEATH

{CAeZj++0 i&cr+.A
3d MANNER OF DEATH

Igfl.NMl
3

h -***

£h=

*

BiTJOftd

•

Q

XDIdr^eontrtjuUlolhoeauMordntti.

f ~ l 8. UNKNOWN
*—' IF USER
d ta unknown la rttaUon lo iw C M M tf^ death.

L DATE OP INJURY f * 0 , Oay, Yr.)

Q

l

WW

39a INJURY AT WORK?

Q1.YM • * » * ,

35s. LOCATION (Stnat or rural routa numear, dty erkwa o»mfy tnd ttttt.)

D

r ~ ) q Une^irmlriidQ 8, Pandhig
UDH-IIVR
Form 12.

30a. OATEREQISTRAR NOT1FEO OF DEATH
(Mo.OtKYr./

tn_J-LlLLJ

fJ1.Yt
1

rjZNo

.g-LYW

Q2.No

PIACB. OfJNJURY TAthoma,ttrm,«
ornco, oVmfitif, atGt (tpaoty)

35Ltf motor vahkta
pMiianfler Or"

ipavMf f dacadanl wai drlvar.

35a 0E8CRIBE HOW INJURY OCCURRED (aataraaquanca of im*a wfttafi iwtimlln k+*y, NAWttE OF INJURY atookf ba artai* to*am31)

This is to certify that this is a true copy of the certificate on file in this office. This certified copy is issued
undet-authority of section 26-2-22 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 As Amended.

> i CERTIFICATION OF VITAL RECORD S M

UTAH CERTIFICATION OF LIVE BIRTH

y

Ian Michael Burns
Sex of Child:

Male

Date of Birth

December 23,2003

Birth Weight:

06 Lbs 01 oz

Time of Birth:

12:44

City of Birth:

Murray

County of Birth: Salt Lake

Birth Attendant: Jeffrey D. Quinn, M.D.

Place of Birth:

Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center

1

Gayle Lisa Berry
Mother's Maiden Nafne

Mother's Date of Birth: August 13, t971

Mothers Place of Birth: New York

Resident City:

Resident State/Country: Utah

Salt Lake City

Michael Aaron Bums
"... Fathers Name

Father's Date d? Birth: July 23,1975

,

-

Father's Piece of Birth: Utah
/

Date of Registration:

December 31,2003

SSA Card Requested:

Yes

Date of Amendment:

September 3,2004

"State File Number:

2003 50021

DATE ISSUED:

September 11,2006

This is an exact reproduction of the document registered in the State Office of Vital Statistics.
Security features of this official document Include: Intaglio Border, V & R images in top cycloids,
ultra violet fibers and hologram image of a hawk over the word valid. This document displays the
date, seal and signature of the State Registrar of Vital Statistics.
Updated Utah State Seal replaces hawk over valid for authenticity.
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Barry E. Nangle
State Registrar
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Michael

December 23.2003
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Gayle Lisa Barry
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Michael Aaron Burng
No father l i s t e d
July 23,1975
Date o f b i r t h
Place of b i r t h
Utah
|9Add deceased father t o i
I's birth certificate>Proofg: Marriage certificate,Death
Certificate of father,ft
t ^Aaron Burns. Letter from Reproductive Cafe Canter
Sperm Cryopregerved & Inaqftination Agreement, Contract from U of p Hospital to
Inseminate Gavle Burns with gpenq from the father in the event of hi death *>lt/L

^t
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* NOTARY rUBLIC
WEMDV BENTLEY
28fl North MOO Wt#l
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DATE ISSUED:
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This Is an exactreproductionof the document registered in the State Office of Vital Statistics
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*~f*W
Barry E. Nangle
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Utah Birth Certification
Ian Michael Burns
Name of Child

Male

December

Sex of Child

23, 2003

Date of Birth

12:44

06 Lbs 01 oz

Time of B i r t h

B i r t h Weight

Murray

Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center

C i t y of B i r t h

• Place of B i r t h

S a l t Lake
County o f £ i r t h

Jeffrey D. Quinn, M.D.
B i r t h Attendant

«f^(M%AilSl«WMiy<WA<<VlW^^iy<VIVIV^M^«»<VAl^M<V^MM^IW^^<VN^AlMMn<«

Gayle Lisa Berry
Mother' s Maiden Name

.

STATE OF UTAH - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH - OFFICE OF VITAL RECORDS AND STATISTICS

AFFIDAVIT TO AMEND A RECORD

<

*

ft

83

THIS AFFIDAVIT FORM CAN ONLY BE USEDT6 MAKECORRECTIONS ON BIRTH RECORDS 1699TO THE PRESENT
All vital records are registered as received. Changes must be made by affidavit. An item on the birth certificate may be changed by
affidavit only once; subsequent changes to the same item must be done by court order.

2
3
4.
5
6.

INSTRUCTIONS
NOT WRIT!- |M THE FIRS? SECTION. Items 1a through 6, have been completed by our office according to the information on the original record, even If
incorrect Corrections and missing Information are NOT to be entered in these spaces
'
|.|yr MHQBR J ™ Bb- opposite each of the incorrect Items, the correct information as It should have been stated at the time of birth. Please type or print
neatly. If adding a name, Include the full name, Including any middle name If additional corrections are required, contact our office to prepare a revised affidav
{JEMS Q and 1 o are generally completed by our office
yyvjo iflAV S|fiN THE AFFIDAVIT IP THE REGISTRANT IS 1B YEARS OR OLDER: The person whose record is being amended must sign as one of the
witnesses, unless mentally Incompetent or physically incapacitated. Parents or other older relatives are preferred witnesses for the second signature An
exception may be made if both parents are able to sign. The signatures must be notarized. Do not sign the affidavit except in front of a notary.
WH9 MAY S>QN T H g AFFIDAVIT IF THE REQISTRANT IS UND&t 16 YEARS OF AGE; Both parents listed on the record If no father is listed on the recor
an older relative of legal age may sign with the mother The signatures must be notarized. Do not sign the affidavit except in front of a notary.
R ^ D THE AFFIDAVIT. IT IS BINDING UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY. The signatories assume complete responsibilityforthe correctness of the amende
information. Two different persons must complete the supporting oaths (items 11 through 15, and 16 through 20.)

7 DO NOT WRfTP IN SPACES 21 OR 22. (This Is reserved for the State Registrar)
8. WHEN PROPFjflt V COMPLETED AND SIGNED return this form to the Office of Vital Records and Statistics, 288 North 1460 West, P O Box 141012, SLC,

UT 84114*1012 If acceptable for registration, it will be filed and become a permanent part of the original record
£££: tf the affidavit Is completed within on* year of the date of birth, there is no fee for filing I t However, there Is a $12.00 fee for the search of the record which Includes a
certified copy of the amended birth certificate. If It Is filed after one year, there Is a $20.00 fee for registration of the affidavit which Includes one certified copy of the
a n v - ^ d certificate.
IF THE APPLICANT OOES NOT RESPOND TO A WRITTEN REQUEST FROM THIS OFFICE WITHIN * 0 OAVS, THE OFFICE WILL RETAIN ALL MONIES PAID.

AMENDED

2003

2 of 2
1a FIRST NAME

.lb MIDDLE NAME

Ian

INFORMATION AS
|3 DATE OF BIRTH
REPORTED ON THE 2 SEX
ORIGINALLY
Male
December 23f2003
REGISTERED
£ NAME OF FATHER
CERTIFICATE

50021

STATE CERTIFICATE NUMBER
1c LAST NAME

Michael

Burns

|4 PUCE OF OCCURRENCE-City and County

Murray, Salt Lake County

HOSPITAL (if applicable)

bottomrood Hospital

6 MAIDEN NAME OF MOTHER

Gayle Lisa Berry
7 ITEM

MAKE NO CORRECTIONS ABOVE THIS LINE
8a FACTS EXACTLY AS STATED ON THE ORIGINAL RECORD
8b FACTS AS THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN STATED ON THE
ORIGINAL AT THE TIMF O F OCCURRENCE

wmssL

No father l i s t e d
Michael Aaron Burns
STATEMENT OF
AMENDMENTS
Date of birth
July 23f1975
Place of b i r t h
Utah
>CHANGE pftdd deceased father to child's birth certificate .Proofs: Marriage certificate, Death
.iSSARY?
Certificate of father,Michael Aaron Burns. Letter from Reproductive Care Center, m
ffiperm
Cryopreserved & Insemination Agreement,Contract from U of U Hospital to
PROOFS USED TO
AMEND RECORD

inseminate Gayle Burns with sperm from the father in the event
I hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I have personal knowledge of the
[above facts and that the Information given Is true and correct
ttlfiE SIGNED

.QVAA

N'JTAJRV PUBLIC
WEN0v UNTIES

mmtnamAn^g^Bm

OATH OF FIRST
WITNESS

IS ADDRESS OF WITNESS (Street. City. Stats. Zip)

;*6Cw*»
Jtnh 0 1 :

,,

©DlS"?af*wertofoOfc. Un.^ZZS"

gfll+MrteCi»HA UT SHIT

I hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I have personal knowledge of theSubscribed &
jabove facts and that the Information given Is true and correct
Notary Public,
16. MATUREOFWITNI
OATH OF SECOND
WNESS

17 DATE SIGNED

£r3-

J V T V J / ^

ESS' 19

^/toJLSj^A^j*^

MyCoi

WENDY BENTlEv
S
E

feO ADDRESS OF WITNESS (Street, City, State, Zip!

A

s

|L

Ufff 7e>x&><& <&-,*;* ^ ucfj/&>

UDOHOVRS-9
REV.P9M
BT DATE ACCEPTED
FOR USE OF STATE

|22 OFFICE OF THE §J£TE REGISTRAR ^
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WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204
Holladay,UT84117
Telephone: (801)277-4292
Facsimile: (801)277-4295

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE C O I R '
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT* .

PETITION FOR ADJUDICATION OF
PATERNITY

IN THE MATTER Or IAN M BURNS,
(DOR 12/23/03)
A Minor Child.

Case No:
Judge

COMES NOW Gayle M. Burns, natural parent and guardian of the above-named minor, by
;

' '- -1

•

;.-.

• ...i

uic <.!.>!. .:. :.-iiows:

petitione; and minor child are resident.*- -tl'Saitl ake County and jurisdiction

is proper.
' • I -

.

.

-K-r

,

'••».

. .

.

•

;at Gayle M Burns was married u Michael .\ Burns on August 24, 1997 in Salt
Lake ('ounty, Utah. (See attached and incorporated Exhibit 1).
'..

~~rly 2000 Michael A. Burns was diagnosed withNon-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.
ai Michael A. Burns subsequently entered a treatment program that included

chemothe py.

O

^OKIifeiijlPASE^

6.

That prior to his receiving chemotherapy he was informed by his physicians that his

semen could be rendered sterile by the chemotherapy.
7.

That Michael A. Burns and his wife, Gayle M. Burns, did discuss their options to

preserve his semen in order to conceive children in the future.
8.

That on or about May 30, 2000 Mr. and Mrs. Burns entered into a Semen Storage

Agreement at the University of Utah School of Medicine, Division of Urology. (See attached and
incorporated Exhibit 2).
9.

That in the Agreement it stated in 3(1):
"In the event of the death of the donor, the donor would like
his vials of semen (b) Maintained in storage for future donation to
Gayle Bums who will assume all of the obligations and terms
described in this contract."

10.

Michael A. Bums' medical condition turned significantly worse in late 2000 and he

specifically discussed with Gayle M. Bums the fact that if he did pass away that he would like his
wife to receive artificial insemination of his stored semen and to give birth to their child.
11.

This idea of stored semen and future artificial insemination was also discussed with

numerousfriendsand family members by Mr. Burns.
12.

That Michael A. Burns did pass away on March 24, 2001. (See attached and

incorporated Exhibit 3).
13.

That subsequently Gayle M. Burns, natural mother of Ian M. Burns, was artificially

inseminated with Mr. Burns' semen on or about May 3,2003 with subject child, Ian M. Burns, being
born on December 23,2003. (See attached and incorporated Exhibit 4).

Petition for Adjudication of Paternity
Case No.

2

. 106

• 14.'. '• That on (he original birfhwrtificateoflm

«-

natural father. (See attached and incorporated Exhibit 5)

,

•

15. . That subsequciuh tia^icK.. barn;. u.opctiiK)! .—; ;a;,, >epartineiii oi \ H'JL \ L X I : . to add the name of Michael A Burns as the natural father to Ian M. Burns' birth certificate. • (See
attached and ii
16.

:

.

• Y •'•'..

• •'•'' '• ' "• .-... • • .''•.. •'

' ' ' • • -;•.• ..•

1 hat this, amendment to the birth certificate was' accepted by the State of Utah,, on, or

:Knn September ^ 2004 and an amended birth certificate < was issued.
: , v . . - p o . . , i ' .

-

7

Y

'

•'•

••

""

.

-

.

;

;':.•

. ' • : ' " •

'•••

•'•

"

(See attached and
•

•'"'.

" .

. " ' • • •

'

"•

••17. ..••.. That-Gayle M Burns did submit a claim,, to the Social, Security Administration ;'

18. •' That, said, claim, was denied by the Social Security Administration.

.•••:'

hat pursuant to UCA § 75-2-114(1) and I JCA §§ 78-45a-7,78-45a-10,78-45e, and
78-45g(l), etseq., petitioner respectfully requests :'.h-. .::

*.

.ki . aiki v.n.. >nc:;

••

>c '

for acijudication of paternity declaring Michael A Burn* the natural father of Ian M Bur- 20.'.

. .'

1 hat pursuant t,< T JCA § 78 4,5 A -6 55 the stainlaitl o! proof is by a pu-poiulaaiu c

of the evidence
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 4 _ day of November, 2007.

Petition for Adjudication of Paternity
Case No.

3

".

.:

121
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

.-)Jy
I hereby certify that on the I y day of November 2007,1 mailed, via the United States post
office, postage prepaid, a true and. correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR
ADJUDICATION OF PATERNITY, to the following:
Social Security Administration
Office of Regional Counsel
Federal Building
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001-A
Denver, CO 80294-1961
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
125 State Street, Suite 3102
Salt Lake City, UT 84138
Utah Attorney General
State Capital Complex
East Office Building #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 .

A

rfnt^iyQai^

Lisa T. Hatton-Ward/Legal Assistant

Petition for Adjudication of Paternity
Case No.

4

WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204
Holladay,UT84117
Telephone: (801) 277-4292
Facsimile: (801)277-4295

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF IAN M. BURNS,
(DOB: 12/23/03)
AMmoi Child.

.

:
:

REQUEST FOR HEARING

:
:

Case No. 074904953
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

COMES NOW Gayle M. Burns, natural parent mid (.'lurilun nl I hi' abnu-narnnl in nun hy
Iirough counsel, William R iladley. and hereby request- a hcarir^ in the above-entitled matter.
RESPECTFU1 l,Y sul

,

Jam

-H.

WILLIAM R. HADLEY-CAttorney for Petitiofier

.147
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the If) day of January 2008,1 mailed, via the United States post
office, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING, to
the following:
Social Security Administration
Office of Regional Counsel
Federal Building
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001-A
Denver, CO 80294-1961
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
125 State Street, Suite 3102
Salt Lake City, UT 84138
Utah Attorney General
State Capital Complex
East Office Building #320 v.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

,jy<*-7<

^ 7 ^ ^ ^ ^

Lisa T. Hatton-Ward/Legal Assistant

Requestfor Hearing
Case No. 074904953

2

t36o Atpo
Afir&Bl
(j^nsfn)
WILLIAM R. HADLEY #52*.
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
2225 E. Murray Holladay ltd, Ste J.M
Holladay,UT84117
Telephone: (801) 277-4292
Facsimile: (801) 277-4295
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
1 h : b MATTER OF U
(DOB: 12/23/03)

NOTICE OF HEARING

BURNS,

A Minor Child.
Civil No: 074904953
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Please be advised that the Hearing in the above-entitled matter will be held on Tuesday, February 5,

DATED this ^

'•/

day of January, 2008.

.
.

•

•

/

•

•

<^^^k
WILLIAM R. HADLEY
Attorney for Petitioner'

V

^

f t

N

H9
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•

•• > '

'

•
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; 162
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
HEARING was mailed to the individual(s) named below by placing a true and correct copy in the United
i / t h i s O _ d. aday
y of January, 2008.
States mail, postage prepaid,
Social Security Administration
OfiBce of Regional Counsel
Federal Building
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001-A
Denver, CO 80294-1961
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
125 State Street, Suite 3102
Salt Lake City, UT 84138
Utah Attorney General
State Capital Complex
East Office Building #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

ffiur^SK kfttiSfrM^^
Lisa T. Hatton-Ward
Legal Assistant

Notice ofHearing
In the Matter ofIan M. Burns
Case No. 074904953

c\\y^

I j "? O

i--* c "
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WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204
Holladay,UT84117
Telephone: (801)277-4292
Facsimile: (801)277-4295

fte,ce/u
'ear

aJZ*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COl IRT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN UIE MATTER OF IAN M. BURNS,

REQUEST FOR HEARING

Case No. 074904953

i »>'\ > v -,l . -«

.

, and

)y and through COUIISC

hereby requests a heanni; m thi-abovcciitiik-c niatuRESPECTFULLY suDmiued this »'•' dt.v M' Febn.an •

WILLIAM R. HADElEY
Attorney for Petitioner

V-

-e ^ \

^ *-

,

/

wuCsh^\

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on t h e ^

day of February 2008,1 mailed, via the United States post

office, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING, to
the following:

Social Security Administration
Office of Regional Counsel
Federal Building
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001-A
Denver, CO 80294-1961
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
125 State Street, Suite 3102
Salt Lake City, UT 84138
Utah Attorney General
State Capital Complex
East Office Building #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Hfii^-i^ ffife^Wl
Lisa T. Hatton-Ward/Legal Assistant

Requestfor Hearing
Case No. 074904953

2

\

Y"

\3hV

TJ

''>

$$

WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204

•S*

<#

ACT

Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Telephone: (801) 277-4292
Facsimile: (801) 277-4295

v ? Cv
^ ^

jCS

IN \ ND FOR SALT LAKL 1 < >l \ r \ , M ATE OF M AIT

i ' I IO SUBMIT FOR DECISION

n i E M A r n K 01 I-\N B:
(l)Ol- 2'23/03;
A Minor Child.

Civil No: 074904953
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

COMES NOW. Wilhan; K iiudlc>. counsel fen Petitioners, and submits for sigii.:iun tin
l li'ik-i'on Million In

\IIRIU1.

I indin|.', ul I n'l

IIKI

I (inclusion > ul I ,n\ mil I tiilci mil nn nli|a tnnr

having been filed with the court or this office, and submits the same for two Orders on said matters.
DATED this__;

J:r of April 2008.

WILLIAM R. HADLEY
Attorney for Petitioner

V^e u v ^ * - w^ i

v
—l * » - . ^hm<
IV&

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the{

day of April 2008,1 mailed, via the United States post office,

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION,
to the following:
Elizabeth "Beth" Anne Park
169 Mountain Peak Drive
Draper, UT 84020
Social Security Administration
Office of Regional Counsel
Federal Building
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001 -A
Denver, CO 80294-1961
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
125 State Street, Suite 3102
Salt Lake City, UT 84138
Utah Attorney General
State Capital Complex
East Office Building #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Jr

'^ lU^BrlO^J

Lisa T. Hatton-Ward/Legal Assistant

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
In the Matter of Ian M. Burns
Case No. 074904953 AD

h~

FILED DISTRICT GOBRT
Third Judicial District

APR 1 5 2088

WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204
Holladay,UT84117
Telephone: (801)277-4292
Facsimile: (801) 277-4295

SALT i AKE COUNT\

\/}Op

By.
Deputy Cierk

IN THE THIRD J UDICI AI , DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR, SAL'I I A K E COUNT* ,'STATE O F HI' Jill

i MA; i b K O F I A N N 1 BI IR NS ,
(DOB 12/23/03)
. J inor Child

OR DER ON M O T I O N Til!" ,• n„ l"\ 11I«",I I l l

. ' •
Judge Anihoin B i.^u \-

this matter shall include tin hstate ol Michael A. Burns, by and though his special aamimslrator
Elizabeth I *ark
2008, \.a.-v M «.\ )Wo02n * w> sucit pvsiiHUi

-r
1 urtnci, 1 n/aheiii - aik did appeal at ai^ acar,:^

scheduled in t his matter on, March 18, 2008 at .the hour of 10:00 a.m and waived service and,, notice

this court: in this matter.

r/

4> i <!:, ' i

"
'!' '

ft>^

KM •Jo

X)

°\

: 175
DATED this / J day of April, 2008.
BY THE

HONOMMg W M B. QUINN
lliirdDisW^'"''^ " ^

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON Fll
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, S^LT;
COUNTY, STATEJ3FJUTAH.
DATE:
i ^t^ffi
' ^
.fyD^rif^
C'
DEPJ/TY COURT CLERK

Order on Motion to Amend
Case No. 0/'4904953

°t

C-

-t

-V
50

WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
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A Minor Child.
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in open court before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn and the petitioner, Gayle M. Burns, and for

special administrator over the Estate of Michael A. Burns, Third Judicial District Court Case No.
083900243, Pro Se, and the parties having been sworn, and the matter having been full < presented
to the Court; the Court now being fully advised makes the following Findings «
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the petitioner, Gayle M. Burns and Michael A. Burns, deceased, were married

on August 24,1997.
2.

That on or about April 20, 1999 Michael A. Burns was diagnosed with Non-

Hodgkin's Lymphoma and at a meeting with his physician was given a 95% survival rate, and he
submitted himself to treatment which included chemotherapy and radiation.
3.

That one of the side-effects of these treatments was the possibility of sterility and he

did enter into a Semen Storage Agreement with the University of Utah Reproductive Center and with
his wife, Gayle Burns, to store his sperm in the event that he was rendered sterile after chemotherapy
and radiation treatments.
4.

That the Semen Storage Agreement was entered into between the parties on or about

May 30, 2000. In this Semen Storage Agreement it indicated that if something should happen to
Michael A. Burns, that he "Would like his vials of semen.. .Maintained in storage for future donation
to Gayle Burns."
5.

That in personal conversations with his wife, Gayle Burns, Michael A. Burns did

express his desire to use the stored semen to have a child in the future by artificial means if he was
rendered sterile by the treatments.
6.

That Mr. Burn's condition took a turn for the worse and on or about February 2001

his chances of surviving the disease were greatly reduced and this led to his death on March 24,
2001.
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Case No. 074904953

2

; 171

7.

That in the last month of Mr. Burn's life he did extensively discuss with his wife and

his immediate family and specifically, his sister, the special administrator, Elizabeth Park, his desire
for Gayle Burns to conceive a child by in vitro fertilization using his sperm and thus would leave his
own child in this world by and with his wife, Gayle Burns.
8.

That Gayle Burns was seen by the Reproductive Center at the University of Utah and

on or about May 3,2003 two embryos were transferred to Ms. Burns with one successfully taken,
and subsequently, Ian M. Burns, the subject child of this petition, was born on December 23,2003.
9.

That on the original birth certificate as issued by the Utah Department of Health,

Michael A. Burns was not listed as the natural father of Ian M. Burns.
10.

That Gayle Bums did petition the Utah Department of Health to amend the birth

certificate and this was submitted to the Department on or about September 3,2004.
11.

That evidence in support of the amendment given to the Utah Department of Health,

Division of Vital Records, included Michael A. Bums and Gayle Bums marriage certificate, Michael
A. Bums Death Certificate and letters from the Reproductive Care Center and the Semen Storage
Agreement from the University of Utah regarding the Semen Storage Agreement and subsequent in
vitro fertilization and birth.
12.

That the Department of Health did issue an amended birth certificate listing Michael

A. Bums as the birth father of Ian M. Bums on or about September 11, 2004.
13.

That in the months prior to Gayle Burns in vitro fertilization she was not seeing any

other male person nor did she have sexual relations with any other male person.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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14.

That Elizabeth Park, special administrator, and the family of Michael A. Bums,

including grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, nephews and nieces, all openly recognize Ian M.
Bums as their grandchild, nephew and cousin and the natural son of Michael A. Bums.
15.

That an Informal Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination of Heirs and

Appointment of Special Administrator was submitted to the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or about February 15, 2008 and in said adjudication it was
determined that the decedent, Michael A. Bums, died intestate, that his heirs were Gayle Bums and
Ian M. Bums, and that Elizabeth Park was appointed special administrator of the estate.
16.

That Gayle Bums then filed this immediate action to establish paternity to obtain

Social Security Survivor Benefits for her son, Ian M. Burns, as survivor of Michael A. Burns.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Venue and jurisdiction in this court are proper.

2.

That pursuant to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity UCA 78-45(A), et seq.,

petitioner needs to show by clear and convincing evidence that Ian M. Burns is the son of Michael
A. Bums.
3..

Testimony and evidence in the matter from Gayle Bums and Elizabeth Park establish

the fact that Michael A. Bums did store his semen with the University of Utah in a cryo-preserved
state with the intent to impregnate his wife, Gayle Bums, in the event he was rendered sterile by the
treatment for Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.
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4.

That eventually Ian M. Bums was conceived by cryo-preserved sperm of Michael A.

Bums by In Vitro fertilization and such sperm was specifically stored for that purpose by Michael
A. Bums.
5.

That the contract entered into by Michael A. Bums and the University of Utah did

give care, custody and control of the semen to Gayle Bums for such fertilization purposes in the
event of the death of Michael A. Burns.
6.

That Michael A. Bums did discuss and intend for Gayle Bums to use this semen for

in vitro fertilization and such was discussed between and agreed to by Gayle Burns and Michael A.
Bums.
7.

That the minor child, Ian M. Bums, has been recognized by Michael A. Bums family

as the soil of Michael A. Bums in all respects and is openly acknowledged and recognized as the
natural son of Michael A. Burns.
8.

That petitioner has met their burden of proof.

9.

That an appropriate Order consistent with these Findings indicating the paternity and

all rights arising therefrom of Ian M. Bums by Michael A. Bums should be issued.
DATED this ^ 5 ? d a y of April, 2008.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF IAN M. BURNS,
(DOB: 12/23/03)

ORDER

A Minor Child.

Case No. 074904953
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

PURSUANT to the petition of Gayle M. Burns, natural parent and guardian of Ian M. Burns,
a minor, in the matter having been regularly heard before this court on March 18,2008, petitioner,
Gayle M. Burns, appearing by and through counsel, William R. Hadley, and Elizabeth Park, special
administrator for the Estate of Michael A. Burns, appearing Pro Se, and the Court being familiar with
the case and taken testimony,
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Michael A. Burns, deceased, is
the natural father of Ian M. Burns, subject child of this matter, born on December 23,2003 in Salt
• 40

Lake County, Utah to his natural mother Gayle M. Burns.

@£LBGR_.

^ ^ p o ^

(

. 168

That allrightsarising from said parent/child relationship including those of care, custody,
support and inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of Ian M. Burns, a minor.
DATED this __Z?day of April, 2008.
BYTHEi
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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
* Refer To: 646-74-5764

Office of Disability Adjudication and Review*
Wallace F. Bennett Federal Building
125 S. State Street, Room 3102
Salt Lake City, UT 84138
Date: August 22,2008

Gayle Burns,
&*e^
on behalf of Ian M.Burns
- A \^<^S^
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NOTICE OF DECISION - FULLY FAVORABLE
I have made the enclosed decision in your case. Please read this notice and the decision
carefully.
This Decision is Fully Favorable To You
Another office will process the decision and send you a letter about your benefits. Your local
Social Security office or another may first ask you for more information. If you do not hear
anything for 60 days, contact your local office.
The Appeals Council May Review The Decision On Its Own
The Appeals Council may decide to review my decision even though you do not ask it to do
so. To do that, the Council must mail you a notice about its review within 60 days from the
date shown above. Review at the Council's own motion could make the decision less
favorable or unfavorable to you.
If You Disagree With The Decision
If you believe my decision is not fully favorable to you, or if you disagree with it for any
reason, you may file an appeal with the Appeals Council.
How to File an Appeal
To file an appeal you or your representative must request that the Appeals Council review the
decision. You must make the request in writing. You may use our Request for Review form,
HA-520, or write a letter.
You may file your request at any local Social Security office or a hearing office. You may
also mail your request right to the Appeals Council, Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike. Falls Church, VA 22041-3255. Please put the Social Security
number shown above on any appeal you file.
Time to File an Appeal
To file an appeal, you must file your request for review within 60 days from the date you get
this notice.
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The Appeals Council assumes you got the notice 5 days after the date shown above unless
you show you did not get it within the 5-day period. The Council will dismiss a late request
unless you show you had a good reason for not filing it on time.
Time to Submit New Evidence
You should submit any new evidence you wish to the Appeals Council to consider with your
request for review.
How an Appeal Works
Our regulations state the rules the Appeals Council applies to decide when and how to review
a case. These rules appear in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 20, Chapter III,
Part 404 (Subpart J).
If you file an appeal, the Council will consider all of my decision, even the parts with which
you agree. The Council may review your case for any reason. It will review your case if one
of the reasons for review listed in our regulations exists. Section 404.970 of the regulations
lists these reasons.
Requesting review places the entire record of your case before the Council. Review can make
any part of my decision more or less favorable or unfavorable to you.
On review, the Council may itself consider the issues and decide your case. The Council may
also send it back to an Administrative Law Judge for a new decision.
If No Appeal and No Appeals Council Review
If you do not appeal and the Council does not review my decision on its own motion, you will
not have a right to court review. My decision will be a final decision that can be changed
only under special rules.
If You Have Any Questions
If you have any questions, you may call, write or visit any Social Security office. If you visit
an office, please bring this notice and decision with you. The telephone number of the local
office that serves your area is (801) 268-1060. Its address is Social Security Administration,
348 E. Winchester Street, Suite 100, Murray, UT 84107.

Donald R. Jensen
U.S. Administrative Law Judge
cc:

William R. Hadley, Esq.
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, #204
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
DECISION
IN THE CASE OF

CLAIM FOR

Ian M.Burns
(Claimant)

RSI
XREF: 529-49-0701
646-74-5764
(Social Security Number)

Michael A. Burns
(Wage Earner)

Gayle Burns, as the biological mother, on behalf of the claimant, Ian Burns, applied for surviving
dependent child benefits on September 1, 2005, alleging that the deceased wage earner, Michael
Burns, was the claimant's father. After receiving unfavorable initial and reconsideration
determinations, the claimant filed a timely request for a hearing on July 13, 2006. Pursuant to
notice, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge was held in Salt Lake City, Utah on
October 3,2007, The claimant's mother personally appeared and testified on behalf of the
claimant, who was not present. The claimant was represented by William Hadley, an attorney.
ISSUES
At issue is whether the claimant is entitled to surviving child dependent insurance benefits on the
earnings record of the wage earner, pursuant to Section 202(d) of the Social Security Act.
Specifically, the undersigned must determine whether the claimant, Ian Burns, is the "child" of
the insured wage earner, Michael Burns, as defined in §§216(e) and 216(h) of the Act.
With respect to the claim for child's survivor benefits, there is an additional issue as to whether
the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act are met. The insured's earnings record
shows that he had acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to be insured at the time of his death.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Gayle Burns, the natural mother of the claimant, and Michael Burns, the insured wage earner,
were married on August 24, 1997. Exhibit 11, page 4. A little less than two years later, around
April 20,1999, the insured was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. His physician gave
him about a 95% chance of survival and the insured agreed to undergo chemotherapy and
radiation treatmentfor his condition. Because one of the potential side effects of these treatments
is sterility, the insured and the claimant's mother decided that the insured would bank his sperm,
so that the couple would be able to have children at a later time. In contemplation of these
actions, the insured entered into a Semen Storage Agreement with the University of Utah
Reproductive Center on May 30,2000. The agreement provided, in pertinent part, that in the
event of the death of the insured, his sperm should be legally transferred to his wife, the
claimant's mother. Exhibit 11, pages 5-8. The insured and the claimant's mother discussed the
issue and the insured expressed his desire to the claimant's mother that she use the stored semen
to have a child in the future by artificial methods, if the insured became sterile as a consequence
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of the cancer treatments. The insured's condition worsened and he died on March 24,2001.
Exhibit 11, page 9; Exhibit 20.
During the month immediately preceding his death, the insured had discussions with his
immediate family, including his wife and his sister, who became the special administrator of his
estate. In these discussions, the insured expressed his desire that the claimant's mother conceive
a child by in vitro fertilization, using his sperm. In this way, he would be able to have a child
with his wife and his child would survive him. Following the death of her husband, the
claimant's mother worked with a fertility clinic to undergo fertility treatments. The
Reproductive Care Center used sperm from the insured, provided to them by the University of
Utah sperm bank, to inseminate the eggs of the claimant's mother. Two embryos were
transferred to the claimant's mother on May 3,2003, and the claimant's mother successfully
delivered him on December 23, 2003, approximately four weeks prior to her predicted due date
and consistent with the pregnancy being the result of the artificial insemination with the
insured's sperm. Exhibit 1, pages 10-13; Exhibit 20.
Following the claimant's birth, he was issued a Utah Birth Certificate showing that he was the
natural child of the mother. Exhibit 11, page 15. Although no father was listed initially, the
Health Department was provided an affidavit and supporting documentation so that a corrected
birth certificate could be issued, showing the insured to be the child's natural father. The
affidavit was signed by both the claimant's mother and by the insured's mother. Exhibit 11,
pages 14,16. A corrected birth certificate was issued by the State of Utah, showing that the
claimant was the natural child of the mother and the insured. Exhibit 11, page 17. The insured's
family, including his sister, mother and father, other siblings, and their children, all openly
recognize that the claimant is the natural son of the insured. An Informal Petition for
Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination of Heirs, and Appointment of Special Administrator
was submitted to the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on
February 15,2008. In that proceeding, it was determined that the insured died intestate and that
his heirs were the claimant and his mother. The mother also filed an action to establish paternity.
Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, UCA §§78-45(A), et seq., the insured was
adjudged to be the natural father of the claimant. Exhibit 20.
The claimant's mother filed an application for benefits on behalf of the claimant, as the surviving
child of the insured, on September 1,2005.
APPLICABLE LAW
Under the Social Security Act, the unmarried minor "child" of a deceased individual who was
insured under the Act may receive survivors' benefits if the child has filed an application for
benefits and was "dependent upon such individual" prior to his death. 42 USC §202(d)(l).
Section 216(e) of the Social Security Act provides that the term "child" means the child or
legally adopted child of an individual.
A child is considered dependent for purposes of this statute if the insured father was living with
or contributing to the child's support at the time of death. Certain children, however, are relieved
of the burden of proving actual dependency, and the law presumes them to be dependent on the
deceased wage earner. Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child who
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is. (A) the legitimate offspring or (B) a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property
from the insured parent's estate under the applicable state intestacy law is deemed dependent as
of the time of the parent's death. If such a relationship is lacking under state law, unless the child
has been adopted by some other individual, (C) he or she is entitled to a presumption of
dependency if the decedent, prior to their death, (1) went through a marriage ceremony with the
other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious legal
defect, would have been valid; or (2) acknowledged in writing that the child was his; or (3) was
decreed by a court to be the child's father; or (4) was ordered by a court to support the child
because the child was his. 42 USC §416(d)-(h).
The regulations parallel the language in the Act. Section 20 CFR 404.355 of the Social Security
Regulations provides that a child is deemed to be the eligible natural child of the insured wage
earner if he or she (1) could inherit the insured's personal property as ids natural child under state
inheritance laws that would be applied if the insured died without leaving a will; (2) is the
insured's natural child and the insured and the child's mother went through a ceremony that
would have resulted in a valid marriage between them except for a "legal impediment" as
described in the Regulations; (3) is the insured's natural child and the mother did not marry the
insured, but the insured either acknowledged in writing that the child was his, was decreed by a
court to be the child's father, or was ordered by a court to contribute to the child's support
because the child was his. The Regulation further provides that, if the insured is deceased, the
acknowledgment, court decree, or court order must have been issued before the insured's death.
(4) If the child's mother had not married the insured, but the child has evidence other than the
evidence provided for in (3), above, to show that the insured is the natural father of the child, the
child must also have evidence to show that the insured was either living with the child or was
contributing to the child's support at the time the child applied for benefits or at the time of the
insured's death. If the applicable state inheritance law would require a court determination of
paternity, the Administration does not require that such a court determination be obtained, but
applies the standard of proof the state would apply in determining paternity.
Because the insured was a resident of and was domiciled in Utah at the time of his death, Utah
law is the applicable state law. Under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, a "child" includes any
individual entitled to take as a child under the Uniform Probate Code by intestate succession
from the parent whose relationship is involved and specifically excludes only "any person who is
only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant." UCA §75-1201(5). To "survive" the insured within the meaning of the Uniform Probate Code, the child
must not have predeceased the insured, but must have lived for at least 120 hours after the
insured's death or for 120 hours after the birth of the child if the child is in gestation, whichever
comes last. UCA §§75-1-201(50), 75-2-104, 75-2-108, 75-2-702. For heirs other than a
surviving spouse, the Code provides that "any part of the intestate estate not passing to the
decedent's surviving spouse, or the entire estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes "to the
decedent's descendents/w capita at each generation as defined in Subsection 75-2-106(2)."
Under §75-2-106(2), the intestate estate wouldfirstgo to the surviving spouse. If there were no
such eligible spouse surviving the decedent, then the estate would be distributed in per capita, or
equal, shares to the decedent's children. If a child did not survive the decedent, then that child's
shares would go to the child's children, and so forth.
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Utah does not discriminate between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children. Under UCA §75-2114(1), [e]xcept as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), for purposes of intestate succession by,
through, orfroma person, an individual is the child of the individual's natural parents, regardless
of their marital status. The parent and child relationship may be established as provided in
Sections 78-45a-7, 78-45a-10, and Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity." Subsections
(2) and (3) contain provisions regarding adopted children and inheritance from or through a child
by the parent, neither of which apply in the present case. See also §78-45g-202, which provides
that a child born to parents who are not married to one another, but whose paternity is
determined under the provisions of Chapter 45g has the same rights under the law as a child who
is born to parents who are married to each other.
In addition, the Uniform Probate Code at UCA §75-1-102 contains the following guidance
regarding construction of its provisions:
(1) This code shall be liberally constructed and applied to promote its underlying
purpose and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents,
missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons;
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of
his property;
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the estate of
the decedent and making distribution to his successors;
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and
(e) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
The Uniform Act on Paternity was enacted primarily to provide for support of children and
payment of birth expenses, regardless of whether the child was born within or outside of a
marriage. §78-45a-l, Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). Under this Act, paternity
may be determined by petition for adjudication by certain persons or entities, or by voluntary
declaration of paternity meeting certain technical requirements. §78-45a-1, et seq.
The parent/child relationship in Utah is also subject to the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, §§7845g, et seq. "Unless parental right are terminated, a parent/child relationship established under
this chapter applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided by other law of
this state." UCA §78-45g-203 (amended and renumbered in 2008 to §78B-15-203).
The father/child relationship is established between a man and a child by: (a) an unrebutted
presumption of the man's paternity of the child under Section 78-45g-204 (now §78B-15-204);
(b) an effective declaration of paternity by the man under Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of
Paternity, unless the declaration has been rescinded or successfully challenged; (c) an
adjudication of the man's paternity; (d) adoption of the child by the man; (e) the man having
consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7, Assisted Reproduction, which
resulted in the birth of the child; or'(f)- an adjudication confirming the man as a parent of a child
born to a gestational (i.e., surrogate) mother if the agreement was validated under Part 8,
Gestational Agreement, or is enforceable under other law. UCA §78-45g-201 (now §78B-15-
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201). [References hereafter will be to the numbering system and statutory language of Chapter
45g in force at the time of the death of the insured and of the child's application.]
Under §78-45g-204, a man is presumed to be the father of a child if (a) he and the mother are
married to each other and the child is born during the marriage; (b) he and the mother were
married to each other and the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation; (c) before
the birth of the child, he and the child's mother married each other in apparent compliance with
the law, even if the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born during the
possibly invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination; (d) if the mother and the father
are married after the child's birth, he voluntarily asserted his paternity, and there is no other
presumptive father, assuming certain other conditions are also met. If a husband provides sperm
for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by his wife as provided in §78-45g-704, then he is the
father of a resulting child born to his wife. §78-45g-703. If there is a consent to assisted
reproduction, it must be in a record signed by the husband and wife, but failure of the husband to
sign does not preclude finding the husband to be the child's father if husband and wife openly
treat the child as their own. §78-45g-704. If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or
an embryo, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse
would be a parent of the child. §78^45g-707.
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
The wage earner, Michael, died fully insured. As is noted above, there is no dispute that the
claimant is the natural child of the insured and the mother. He has not been adopted by any other
persofi. An application was filed on behalf of the claimant, who is an unmarried minor child,
now four years of age. Therefore, all other requirements being met, the inquiry centers on
whether the claimant was actually or was presumed to be dependent upon the insured under the
applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.
I. The evidence supports finding that the claimant is presumptively entitled to benefits.
There are several alternative rationales for presuming the child to be the dependent of the
insured. As they apply to the claimant, they are discussed below in the order in which they
appear in the Act:
(A)

The claimant is the''legitimate" offspring of the deceased insured.

Utah no longer recognizes a statutory distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
offspring. Under UCA §75-2-114(1), [e]xcept as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), for
purposes of intestate succession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the child of the
individual's natural parents, regardless of their marital status. See also §78-45g-202, which
provides that a child born to parents who are not married to one another, but whose paternity is
determined under the provisions of chapter 45g has the same rights under the law as a child who
is born to parents who are married to each other.
Although the claimant was not born during the marriage or within 300 days of his father's death
(§78-45g-204 (a)-(c)), under UCA §78-45g-703, Utah's Uniform Act on Paternity provides that,
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"[i]f a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by his wife as provided
in Section 78-45g-704, he is the father of a resulting child born to his wife." If a spouse dies
before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the
resulting child Unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child. §78-45g-707.
In the present instance, the insured provided sperm for the purpose of assisted reproduction by
his wife in the event he became unable to produce viable sperm following his cancer treatments.
In addition, there is a Semen Storage Agreement with the University of Utah Reproductive
Center signed on May 30,2000 by the insured and his wife that satisfies this requirement. The
Semen Storage Agreement does not contain the specific language of parentage, but contains
language indicating that, in the event of the insured's death, he wished his semen to be
maintained in storage for future donation to his wife, the claimant's mother. It is logical that this
was understood by the insured to iiiean that he recognized and agreed that he would be the father
of the resulting child. There is parole evidence clarifying the understanding and intent of the
insured and his wife, including the testimony of the wife under oath and the testimony of the
insured's family members. The State of Utah also recognized this father-child relationship in
issuing a birth certificate identifying the insured as the claimant's father, based upon the evidence
presented to the issuing agency. Exhibit 11, pages 15-18.
There is no dispute that the claimant is the natural child of the deceased insured wage earner and
the mother. Therefore, the claimant is the "legitimate offspring" of the insured and is entitled to
benefits on this basis. 42 USC §416(e). Even if there were some question as to the applicability
or satisfaction of this provision, the claimant would be entitled to survivor's benefits under
additional provisions of the Act.
(B) The claimant is a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured's
estate under Utah intestacy law.
Section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act says that a claimant shall be considered a "child"
for the purpose of entitlement if he or she would be entitled to inherit personal propertyfromthe
insured person under the law of intestate succession of the State where the insured person had his
true fixed and permanent home at the time the application is filed (if the insured is living) or at
the time of the insured's death. "Laws of intestate succession" describe how property is to be
distributed when a person dies without leaving a will.
For heirs other than a surviving spouse, the Utah Uniform Probate Code provides that "any part
of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving spouse, or the entire estate if there
is no surviving spouse, passes "to the decedent's descendents^er capita at each generation as
defined in Subsection 75-2-106(2)." Under §75-2-106(2), if there were no eligible spouse
surviving the decedent, then the estate would be distributed in equal shares to the decedent's
children. Under UCA §75-2-114(1), an individual is the child of their natural parents, regardless

of the parents' marital status. Tie undersigned also notes that the old requirement of intestacy
laws that an heir be a "life inbeing" at the time of the decedent's death no longer exists in Utah,
nor does it appear in other jurisdictions that have adopted the modern Uniform Probate Code.
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The father/child relationship between the claimant and the insured is established by all of the
following alternative methods provided for by Utah law: (a) an unrebutted presumption of the
man's paternity of the child under Section 78-45g-204; (c) an adjudication of the insured's
paternity; (e) the insured having consented to assisted reproduction by his wife, which resulted in
the birth of the child.
Under the applicable provisions of §78-45g-204 and -703, the insured is presumed to be the
father of the claimant, who was born to the insured's wife, because the insured, as a husband,
provided sperm for, and consented to, assisted reproduction by his wife as provided in §78-45g704. It is undisputed that the insured provided the sperm for assisted reproduction by his wife,
who gave birth to the claimant following such assisted reproduction, following implantation of
embryos created using the decedent's sperm. The record documents the procedures that were
followed by the respective clinics. In addition, there is an agreement documenting the insured's
consent, and it is in a written document signed by the insured and his wife before the insured's
death. This application of Utah intestacy law is consistent with the evidence we have concerning
the insured's intent. In addition, although occurring after th^ death of the insured, the Utah State
court issued an adjudication of paternity. Exhibit 20.
The New Jersey Superior Court addressed similar issues in In re Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d 1257
(N.J. Sujter.Ct. 2000), a case involving a plaintiff who sought a declaration from the court that
her posthumously implanted twins were eligible for benefits under the Act. In that case, the
plaintiffs husband died of leukemia after having stored sperm so that his wife would be able to
have his children. The plaintiff was implanted with the embryos about a year after her husband's
death, and subsequently gave birth to twin daughters. The husband had expressed his desire that
the plaintiff use his sperm to conceive children after his death. Therefore, the New Jersey court
held that the children were the legal heirs of the deceased under state law, and recognized that
this status would impact their eligibility for benefits under the Act. To similar effect, see
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002).
Under the provisions of the intestacy laws of the State of Utah, the claimant would be eligible to
inherit from his father, the insured. He would also, therefore, be entitled to receive survivor's
benefits under the Act. "Applicants who according to such law would have the same status
relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such." 42 USC
§416(h)(2)(A).
(C) The claimant is entitled to a presumption of dependency under the alternatives to a
determination under State intestacy provisions.
Even if the claimant were not eligible to inherit under the applicable State intestacy laws, he is
entitled to a presumption of dependency because the decedent, prior to his death, entered into a
valid marriage with the claimant's mother. 42 USC §416(h)(2)(B). There may be some question
as to whether a child who is conceived after the death of one of the parents is, in fact, a child of
the marriage, because of the presumptive termination of the marriage at the death of one of the
spouses. However, Utah law has specifically recognized that such children are, in fact, children
of that marriage. Cf §§78-45g-204,78-45g-703,78-45g-704,78-45g-707.
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With respect to the second alternative to the intestacy determination, that the insured
acknowledge in writing that the child was his, there is an indication that the insured did make
such a written acknowledgment, albeit indirectly, prior to his death. 42 USC §416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I).
Although the claimant was not yet conceived, the insured acknowledged that he had donated
sperm in order that his wife should be able to bear his child in the event that he became sterile as
a consequence of the cancer treatments he was to undergo. It would logically follow that the
decedent also acknowledged that any resulting child would be his. Any other result would be
biologically, and logically, impossible. Apparently the State of Utah agreed, because it issued a
birth certificate naming the decedent insured as the claimant's father. Exhibit 11, pages 15-18.
With respect to the third alternative, there is a court decree of paternity finding that the claimant
is the natural child of the insured. Exhibit 20. Although this does meet the requirements for
determination of paternity under Utah law, the decree does not meet the additional requirement
of the Act (42 USC §416(h)(3)(C)(i)(II)), andthe Regulations (20 CFR §404.355), because the
decree was issued after the insured's death, and not before.
The fourth option does not apply here, because there has been no such child support order.
The claimant is entitled to receive survivor's benefits under 42 USC §416(h)(2)(B) and 42 USC
§416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I):
II. Payment of benefits is consistent with existing Administration precedent and policy.
In Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), the Administration addressed the question as to whether a child
conceived by artificial means after the death of the insured is a "child" for purposes of the receipt
of child's benefits under §202(d)(l) of the Social Security Act. The Ninth Circuit decided the
case ofGilletuNettingy.Barrihart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2001), reh 'g denied (9th Cir. Dec. 14,
2004), giving rise to the Acquiescence Ruling. Although the Ruling is limited in applicability to
determinations or decisions within the Ninth Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the Northern Mariana Islands), the Ruling
and the underlying case are instructive.
The facts of Gillette-Netting are similar to the facts in the present case. On August 19,1996,
Rhonda Gillette-Netting filed applications for child's insurance benefits on behalf of her twin
children as survivors of the insured, Robert Netting. The twins were born 18 months after the
death of the insured. They were conceived by in yitro fertilization using sperm that the insured
hadfrozenand stored before he died. The Social Security Administration denied the claims,
finding that the twins did not meet the statutory definition of "child" and that neither twin was
dependent upon their father at the time of his death, as required by the Act. The United States
District Court for the District of Arizona affirmed the Administration's denial of benefits. After
the District Court denied a motion for reconsideration, the twins' mother filed an appeal with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
decision of the district court and held that the twins were entitled to benefits because, as the
biological children of the insured, they met the statutory definition of "child." The court held
that §216(h)(2), (3) of the Act did not apply in that case, and, therefore, there was no need to
consult the law of intestate succession for Arizona. The court reasoned that the twins were
deemed dependent upon the insured under §202(d)(3) of the Act, because under Arizona law,
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they were the "legitimate" children of the insured. Under Arizona law, "[e]very child is the
legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful
wedlock." Ariz. Rev. Stat. §8-601 (1975). Because the insured was married to the mother of the
twins and was the biological father of the twins, the twins were legitimate under State law.
The Administration interprets the Act to require that an after-conceived child must be able to
inherit under State law in order to meet the statutory definition of a "child" under the Act. In
addition, the child must also show that he or she was "dependent upon" the insured at the time of
the insured's death. Under §202(d)(3), a "legitimate" child is "deemed dependent" upon the
insured at the time of their death, unless the child was adopted by someone else. The Ninth
Circuit found that the twins established "child" status under the Act solely based upon being the
biological children of the insured, and that §216(h) did not apply unless the child's parentage was
disputed. The court also found that, under Arizona law, an insured individual's biological child
conceived by artificial means after the death of the insured would be considered "natural" if the
parents were married at the time of the insured's death. The Administration stated that in a claim
for survivor's benefits in the Ninth Circuit, the biological child of an insured individual
conceived by artificial means after the death of the insured would be considered the insured's
"child" for purposes of the Act, and §216(h) would not be applied. In addition, if such child
were considered "legitimate" under State law, the Administration would consider the child to be
the "legitimate" child of the insured and thus deemed dependent upon the insured for purposes of
§202(d)(3). All of the States and jurisdictions in the Ninth Circuit, with the exception of Guam,
had eliminated distinctions between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children, and allowed all
children the same rights between parents and children without regard for the parents' marital
status. Therefore, if all other requirements are met, the Administration would consider such a
child to be entitled to child's benefits under §202(d). AR 05-1(9).
Finally, the Administration amended its policy manual in 1998 to set forth its internal policy
determination that a child conceived by artificial means after the death of the insured wage
earner cannot be entitled to survivor's benefits under 42 USC §416(h)(3), but such a child can be
entitled to benefits under 42 USC §416(h)(2)(A). POMS §GN 00306.001C.C. (The Program
Operations Manual System, or POMS, is the set of internal operating instructions used by
Administration field personnel in processing applications for benefits.) Thus, Administration
policy and precedent are in accord with the determination to allow benefits in the present case.
The Regional Chief Counsel opinion that was provided in this matter was issued before the
effective publication date of the Acquiescence ruling discussed above, and therefore omitted
consideration of recent Administration policy, for example. Therefore, the undersigned has
considered that opinion, but has updated and reconsidered the law and its application.
III. Payment of benefits in the present case is consistent with the statutory purpose of the Act
The Act was not intended merely to replace actual support that a child was receiving and then
lost through the death of the insured parent. Instead, the statute was designed to replace
obligations of support or potential support lost through the death of the insured parent. Children
in the presumptive groups may be statutorily entitled to benefits, even if they have never been
actually dependent upon the father through whom they claim. S.Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., 110 (1965).
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[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of legitimate children are
actually dependent upon their parents for support. Likewise,... the children of an invalid
marriage ... would typically live in the wage earner's home or be supported by him... When
an order of support is entered by a court it is reasonable to assume compliance occurred. A
paternity decree, while not necessarily ordering support, would almost as strongly suggest
support was subsequently obtained. Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the
imprimatur of a judicial proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption.
Men do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an illegitimate child unless
the child is theirs and a man who has acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it
support than one who does not.
Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F.Supp. 1117,1128 (Md. 1973).
The Social Security insurance programs have been participatory from the outset; benefits have
not been extended to persons without at least a close relationship to the individual who paid into
the system during his or her working life. However, Congress did not create and amend the Act
with the idea that it was fulfilling any narrow contractual obligation owed to the program
participant. To the contrary, Congress has continually increased the amount of benefits paid and
has expanded the pool of eligible recipients by singling out additional, identifiable groups having
both the requisite relationship to the contributing worker and a degree of probable need which, in
the judgment of the legislature, justifies assistance.
As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act provided for benefits only to the wage
earner. In 1939, additional provisions were made for benefits to the wage earner's family,
including wives and widows and subsequently adding husbands and widowers in 1950.
Subsequent amendments have changed the statute in the direction of expanded coverage, the
United States Supreme Court has noted, but the basic scheme of coverage has remained
unchanged. Children have been covered by the Act, including children of deceased wage earners
for whom the loss of the parent is an immediate source offinancialneed. Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199 (1977). The House Committee Report described widows over the age of 65,
widows with children, orphans, and dependent parents over the age of 65 (to whom the 1939
amendments extended benefits) as being the "groups of survivors whose probable need is
greatest." H.R.Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1939).
With respect to children of a deceased wage earner, the Supreme Court stated that
Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency was obviously
to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was unwilling to assume that every
child of a deceased insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming dependency
on the basis of relatively readily documented facts, such as legitimate birth, or existence
of a support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate the
likelihood of continued actual dependency. Congress was able to avoid the burden and
expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large number of cases where
dependency is objectively probable.
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Matthews v. Lucas, All U.S. 495, 508-09 (1976). The same reasoning should control in the
present case. Title II is a program of mandatory wage deductions that was designed to ensure
that a worker's dependents would have some income in the event of the worker's retirement,
death, or disability. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282,283 (1979)(Title II "attempts to obviate,
through a program of forced savings, the economic dislocations that may otherwise accompany
old age, disability, or the death of a breadwinner.") The worker is legally compelled to set aside
a portion of his wages in order to earn benefits to provide for his dependent children in the event
he becomes unable to do so himself. The sole and express purpose of Title II children's benefits
is to support dependent children. Matthews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181,185-86, and n. 6 (1976);
Matthews v, Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974).
The undersigned is cognizant that there are competing considerations. On the one hand, the Act
and its underlying purposes support the grant of benefits to the claimant. On the other hand, the
undersigned has an obligation to the Social Security trust fund and to the taxpayers paying into
that fund. The undersigned finds that payment of benefits in this case is not only in accordance
with the law, but does not pose an unacceptable risk of significant depletion of the trust fund.
The purpose of the statutory scheme has consistently been described as intending to provide
support for the dependents of a wage earner who has lost his or her earning power through
disability, old age, or death. The Act was expanded to include "illegitimate" children who could
provide some indicia of their dependency, whether by a status that gave them presumptive
dependency or by proof of actual dependency.
Similarly, to include after-conceived children who are able to provide some indicia of parentage
in accordance with the provisions of the Act and applicable State law does not risk "over
inclusion" to the detriment of the trust fund. According to one estimate, about 60,000 births
occurred each year in the United States as the result of artificial insemination1. Certainly not all
of these would be posthumously conceived children seeking survivor's benefits. Minor children
of deceased workers who are receiving survivor's benefits have been in the range of 54% to 56%
of the "orphan population" since 1997, and the rate has been falling steadily since at least 19802,
despite the increase in conception by artificial means. Further, projections for Title II needs are
based upon actuarial assumptions, including projected fertility rates for women, without regard
for how, when or why they conceive during their child-bearing years. Therefore, the undersigned
finds that the inclusion of after-conceived children who meet statutory requirements as set forth
above will not impose an unnecessary or unreasonable burden on the Social Security trust fund.
DECISION
It is the decision of the Administrative Law Judge that the claimant, Ian Burns, born December
23, 2003, is entitled to surviving dependent child's benefits pursuant to 42 USC §§202, et seq.
and 20 CFR §§404.535 based upon on the earnings record of the insured wage earner, Michael
Burns, beginning from the date of claimant's birth.

1

U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003 Assisted
Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Report.
2
"Short-Range Actuarial Projections of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program, 2005," Actuarial
Study No. 119, Social Security Administration.
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The Administrative Law Judge recommends that the claimant's mother, Gayle Bums, be
appointed as the minor child's (claimant's) representative payee.

Donald R. Jensen
U.S. Administrative Law Judge
August 22, 2008
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39

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

TRANSCRIPT
In the case of

Claim for
Period of Disability
Disability Insurance Benefits

Gayle Burns
(Claimant)
529-49-0701
(Wage Earner) (Leave blank in
Title XVI Cases or if name is
same as above)

646-74-5764
(Social Security Number)

Hearing Held
at
Salt Lake City, Utah
__
(Room No., Building, Street Address, City, State)
on
October 3, 2007
(Month, Day, Year)
by
.

APPEARANCES:

Donald Jensen
(Administrative Law Judge)

Gayle Burns, Claimant
William Hadley, Attorney for Claimant
Elizabeth Park, Witness for Claimant

.

,202
INDEX OF TRANSCRIPT
In the case of:

Account Number

Gayle Burns, Claimant

646-74-5764
•• P a g e .
-

Testimony of Gayle Burns

commencing

27

Testimony of Elizabeth Park

commencing

38

4

rv w

—

(The following is a transcript in the hearing held before
Donald Jenson, Administrative Law Judge, Office of Hearings and
Appeals, Social Security Administration, on October 3, 2007, at
Salt Lake City, Utah, in the case of Gayle Burnes, Social Security
Number 646-74-5764. The claimant appeared in person and was
represented by William Hadley, Attorney. Also present was
Elizabeth Park, Witness)
(The hearing commenced at 2:00 p.m., on October 3, 2007.)
OPENING STATEMENT BY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
ALJ:

The hearing in the case of Gayle Burnes, a claimant for

Social Security survivor's benefits, mother's benefits on the account
of wage earner Michael A. Burnes, 529-49-0701.

And the case of

Ian Burnes, a claimant for survivor's benefits, child's benefits on
the claim of the same wage earner, Michael A. Burnes are now both open
at 2:02 p.m.

The hearing is being held in Salt Lake City, Utah on

Wednesday, October 3, 2007.

The claimant, Gayle Burnes, is present at

the hearing represented by counsel, Attorney William Hadley.

The

child, Ian Burnes, being a minor and quite young at that is not a
necessary witness at this hearing.
provide and is not present.
William Hadley.

There being nothing he could

He is, however, represented by the same,

How would you have me address you, Ms. or Mrs.

Burnes?
CLMT:
ALJ:

Mrs. Burnes.
Mrs.

Mrs. Burnes, my name is Donald Jenson, I'm an

Administrative Law Judge with Social Security, and your case is
assigned to me for a hearing.

Now a Social Security hearing is quite

simple, the rules of evidence and procedure you see in the courts
don't all apply in this kind of administrative hearing.

However,

while testifying today you and any other witness will be under oath
and the proceedings are all being recorded.
asking you questions first.

We'll proceed today by my

After my questions for you your attorney
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ALJ:

But 30 days ought to be sufficient, if it's not, I know

things come up, things do happen, ask for more.
ATTY: Okay.
ALJ: Most reasonable requests are always granted.
usually almost always usually.

They're

Okay. Anything else by way of

opening?
ATTY: No.
ALJ:

Should I proceed with the examination --.

Examination of your --do you want to do the primary

examination and me ask follow-up questions or do you want me to do.-.--. ...
ATTY:
ALJ:

Go ahead.

I think you probably --"

I know how to do it in a disability case.

I do thousands

of them, well, 500 times 12, I do 600, 50 times 12, I do 600 a year
approximately, so I know how to do the examination in disability
claims.

I'm not sure I know where I'm going on asking questions here.

But let me just ask here.

Just some background stuff, information.

(The Claimant, GAYLE BURNS, having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows-.)
EXAMINATION OF CLAIMANT BY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Q Mrs. Burns, I have your address as 11074 South Schilling
Avenue, Number 1405 in South Jordan, is that still correct?
A

That's not correct.

Q

You have a new address?

A

I do.

Q

What is your new.address?

A

It's 738 Gables, G-A-B-L-E-S, Street, Midvale, Utah 84047.

Q Do you have a new phone number as well?
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A

No, the phone number is still the same.

Q

516-2584?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Let me change that on both of these files here.

Now,

there is a factual issue here whether or not Ian is the child of
Michael here.

We have documentation that in vitro fertilization,

sperm storage and in vitro fertilization was undergone.

That does not

of necessity mean that it is -- that Ian's birth is the result of that
in vitro fertilization.

Were you seeing anyone else at the time that

Ian was conceived?
A

I was not.

Q

Had you been seeing anyone else within the prior year before

A

No, I have not.

Q

So you're not engaged in sexual relationships with anyone

that?

else, there's no possible other person who could have inseminated you?
A

No.

Q

Nor within the previous year?

A

No.

Q

Had you and your husband had any other children before Ian was

conceived?
A

No, we had not.

Q

Have you had any other pregnancies before this time?

A

No, I have not.

Q

Or since then?

A

No.
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Q

And you are currently single?

A

I am. ;• _

Q

Have you married anyone since your husband's death?

A

I have not.

Q

Has genetic testing been done to establish genetically that

. .

Ian is the child of Michael?
A

It has not.

Q

At the time that the semen sample was obtained, Michael was

about to undergo radiation therapy for the cancer.

Where was the

cancer?
A

He had Non Hodgkins Lymphoma and he had a tumor behind his

sternum.
Q

So Non Hodgkins.

A

Lymphoma.

Q

Uh-huh.

A

There was.

Q

Where?

A

Behind his sternum.

Q

When the Non Hodgkins Lymphoma and tumor mass was diagnosed,

And there was a tumor mass?

what prognosis were you and he given of his survivability?
A

He was given excellent chance, he was given about a 95 percent

chance of survival.

But the chemotherapy and radiation treatments was

most definitely going to leave him sterile was what the doctor told
us.
Q

Both the chemo and radiation?

A

Correct.
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Q

To the best of your recollection, at the time that this semen

sample was taken, had you or he discussed the possibility that he
would not survive the chemo and radiation, that he would die and
whether or not he wanted to leave you with a child that he was not
going to be able
A

to support?

We hadn't discussed it until we actually signed this agreement

where he had to notate what happened what happened if he did die, what
he wanted.

And before we signed the agreement we went home that night

and had a discussion about if he did pass away he wanted the sperm to
go to me so that a piece of him would be -- a piece of him and I would
be on the earth.
Q

He wanted me to have his kids.

So you did not sign that immediately when they presented you

with that option?
A

No, we didn't.

Q

Were you there with him when it was first presented to him,

that question?
A

I was, yes.

.

Q

And the two of you wanted to go home and talk about it?

A

We did.

Because of his survival rate, the 95 percent we

hadn't really even considered him not surviving, so that's the matter
of discussion that night.
Q

And he decided he wanted a piece of him -- see, there are two

competing interests here, a piece of me going on or he's saddling you
with a burden that I can't help you support, two competing interests
going on here —
A

Right.

• .
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Q

- that need to be resolved.

And he resolved that to the best

of your recollection here, and I know you're not a disinterested party
•here. •

A Right.
Q

To this conversation.

To the best of your recollection he

said that he wanted a piece of him to go on even if he should die
before the child was conceived? .
A

He did.

He wanted a child of his on the earth.

Q

The next day he signed that?

A

He did.

Q

Do you have a copy of that agreement in front of you?

A

I do.

Q

Would you open that up, please.

The next day he went in to do the deposit.

A Sure.
Q

Page, it's Exhibit 6 in my file here, there is on the last

page of that a scribble on the first line, donor's signature.

Is that

your husband's signature?
A

That is. He was practicing to be a doctor.

Q

Do you have anything else that would have his signature on it

that I could compare to that?
A

I do.

I have our marriage, the ceremonial license that they

gfive you when you get married.
Q

You have that with you?

A

I do.

Q

Okay.

I would like to see something to compare that with.

Nobody could read my signature either.
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A

He was quite proud of his signature actually.

Q

I think I always wanted to be a doctor.

A

He did too.

Q

Do you have that there?

pass that up here.

Oh, my apologies, I didn't see you

I'm no handwriting expert, but this signature on

this form here just has three initials, M-A-B or M-A something, maybe
a B, it looks close to the way he made the B on Burns.
write out Burns.
okay. Thank you.

It easily could be his signature.

He didn't

I'll accept it,

Likewise his initials on page 3 of this agreement

here, that would be M^B?
A Correct.
Q

Okay.

All right.

Has Michael's family accepted Ian as a

grandchild?
A

They have. Michael's mother is constantly telling me how much

Ian is like Mike growing up.
Q

Was anybody else party to this conversation with you and your

husband when he decided that if he should die he would want you to
conceive a child from his semen?
A No human being, just our cats.
Q

Okay.

Nobody else witnessed him.

A

Nobody else, no.

It was, however, brought up between friends.

Michael was very open about his treatment and he was telling our
friends about the treatment and that he had to store his semen and
they -- it was a very emotional night about dealing with the fact that
he could die.
Q

Not too many of us have to deal with that issue.
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A

Not at 25.

Q

It just happens.

Well, even at 85 you're still thinking

you're going to be there for the next year.
A

That's true.

Q

I'm not 85 yet.

A

That's true.

Q

It's still a surprise when it comes.

A

Oh, yes.

ALJ:

For most of us anyway.

ATTY:

All right, Counsel.

Just a few follow-up questions, Your Honor.

EXAMINATION OF CLAIMANT BY ATTORNEY:
Q

You indicated that nobody else really heard the conversation

about him wanting to have a child with you at -ALJ:

Well my only -- was that conversation that night when she

said that he made that decision.

No one else was party to that

decision making process going on here.

He may well have expressed it

to other people after that, I didn't get into that.
ATTY:

Okay.

BY ATTORNEY:
Q

Any of the physicians that you and Michael went to and talked

about this, who were they?
A

There was his treating doctor, Dr. Martha Glen and the doctor,

I think his name was Carrell over at the urology department at the
university.
ALJ:
CLMT:

Doctors who?
Glen and Carrell, C-A, I think, R-E-L-L, is that.

,'23ft
'

ATTY:
ALJ:

OA-R-R-E-L-L.

That's part of Exhibit 6, Your Honor.

Okay.

BY ATTORNEY:
Q

34
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And Ian signed this on May 30, 2000 and he passed away on

March 24, 2001.

When did he actually get worse where he started

discussing this?
A

He went through two rounds of chemo and we had to go through a

bone marrow transplant and at that point his chances were 50/50 and we
had to discuss more of what was going to happen if he passed away.
Q

When approximately was that?

A

That was, let's see, he went for bone marrow of 2000, December

of 2000, toward the end.
Q

Did either of you think about going back and looking at this

contract and making any changes on it that would indicate that the
saved sperm would be being used for artificial insemination?
A

I don't think we thought about the agreement at that time

because it was quite a trying time for us.

I think what we as lay

people had thought of as the agreement was that it would have taken
care of it because we didn't see any reason not to think it would.
Q

So it was you and Michael's understanding that if he passed

away the contract that you'd signed seven months before gave you the
right to use that semen to impregnate yourself?
A

It was my understanding, yes, and Michael's.

ATTY:
ALJ:

I have nothing further, Your Honor.
All right.

in-law as a witness?

And you wanted to call the claimant's sister-
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ALJ:

But would the Supreme Court give an advisory opinion to a

private party as opposed to being requested by the Federal District
Court?

I don't know either.

ATTY:
ALJ:
ATTY:
ALJ:
ATTY:

No, they won't.
I doubt it.
They won't, because there's nothing.
It would -I'd have to go in and ask for, from what I've read, if I

go get genetic testing I. can go and get a. District Court to make a
ruling that Michael is the natural father and that slides it right
into the Probate Code that he can inherit.

And I'd like to say it's

that simple, but when we were going over this I had to take into cost
concerns.
ALJ:
ATTY:
ALJ:
ATTY:
ALJ:

Okay.
Because in getting it from in-laws and such and what not.
All right.
But that's probably what we're going to have to do.
Do what you can, Counsel.

sorry, Ms. Park here.

Let's take testimony from, I'm

Would you please come, pull a chair up here

close to the table, Ms. Park, over to the side of the Counsel on the
other side will work.
WTN:

This?

ALJ:

Yeah, you can sit at that table, no one is using it.

(The Witness, ELIZABETH PARK, having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows:)
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS BY ATTORNEY:
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Q

Could you state you name for the Court?

A

Elizabeth Park.

Q

And what is your relationship to the decedent, Michael Burns?

A

He was my brother.

Q

And what is your relationship to Ian Burns?

A

I am his aunt.

Q

And why do you say that?

A

Because he was created with my brother's sperm, with my

sister-in-law and born to my sister-in-law and that is the way it is.
He is my nephew.
Q

How many other brothers and sisters do you have?

A

I have three other brothers and one sister.

i

Q And do they all recognize Ian as their nephew?
A

Yes, they do.

Q

Do you have your own children?
i

A No.
Q Do your brothers and sisters, do they have children?
A

Yes, they do.

Q

Do they all consider Ian their cousin?

A

Yes, they do.

Q

Is he treated any different than any of them?

<

A No, not at all.
Q

Your mother and father, how do they look at Ian?

A

He is their grandchild.

Q

Do they treat him any different from any of their other

grandchildren?

."'•',
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A

No, they don't.

Q

Prior to your brother's death, did you ever happen to have any

conversations with him about this semen storage he had with his wife?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

What was said?

A

Well, he let me know that they were going to be storing his

semen and at that point it was for when he recovered.

And we also

talked about if he happened to not recover what he would do and he
talked about having Gayle have his child after he died.
• Q

He wanted Gayle to have his child if he did not survive the

treatment and cancer?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

Anything else that you could state to the Court that might be

helpful?
A

Well, I brought along, I guess you could call it evidence of

our support of Ian as a member of our family.

I was married three

weeks ago and Ian was my ring barer, so I brought pictures.

If you

wanted to reminisce with me.
ALJ:

No, thank you though.

WTN:

Thank you.

ATTY:
ALJ:

No.

Congratulations.

I have nothing further.
Nothing further.

Anything additional on this matter,

Counsel, other than your briefing this matter?
ATTY:
ALJ:

No, Your Honor.
If you feel strongly that you'd like to see -- I described

for you the counsel's position.

I could just transcribe that portion
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MEMORANDUM
Date:

October 20,2008

From:

Assistant Regional Commissioner
Processing Center Operations

Subject: Administrative Law Judge Decision
To:

SSN: 529-49-0701
NH: Michael A. Burns

Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
Office of Appellate Operations
5107 Leesburg Pike
Falls Church VA 22041-3255

We request that you review the August 22,2008 Administrative Law Judge (AU) decisions
finding that Ian M. Burns is entitled to child's benefits and Gayle Burns is entitled to mother's
benefits on the record of Michael A. Burns, the deceased number holder (NH). The ALT failed to
follow the guidance of the Office of General Counsel in interpreting the state law of Utah, the
state in which the number holder was domiciled at the time of his death. The matter under
consideration is whether a biological child of a NH had established child status under State law
for legitimacy purposes. In the state of Utah a child bom through in vitro fertilization after the
death of the number holder would only be recognized under state intestacy laws if the parent
consented to being aparent "in a record" before the implantation, In this case there was no such
record established.
Because Ian M. Burns does not qualify for child's benefits, Gayle Burns cannot be entitled to
mother's benefits. To be entitled to mother's benefits a claimant must be caring for a child of the
insured person, and that child must be entitled to child's benefits.
Our request for review is supported by the Office of General Counsel. As you are aware, the
decision to review must be made by October 21,2008.
Please let me know if you wish to discuss this. The staff contacts are Don Parks (510) 970-1425
and Bob Strouse, (510) 970-1257.
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Stephen Breen
Assistant Regional Commissioner
Processing Center Operations
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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Office of Disability Adjudication
and Review
5107 Leesburg Pike
Falls Church, VA 22041-3255
Telephone: (703)605-8000
Date:

646-74-5764 Ian M. Burns
528-47-7242 Gayle Burns
529-49-0701 CI and E Michael Burns

AUG 1 9 2009
NOTICE OF APPEALS COUNCIL DECISION
UNFAVORABLE

Ms. Gayle Burns o/b/o herself and
Mr. Ian M. Burns
738 Gables Street
Midvale, UT 84047

The enclosed decision is the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in your case.
Please read this notice and the decision carefully.
If You Disagree With This Decision
If you disagree with this decision, you may ask for court review by filing a civil action.
If you do not ask for court review, this decision will be a final decision that can be changed
only under special rules.
How To File A Civil Action
You may file a civil action (ask for court review) by filing a complaint in the United States
District Court for the judicial district in which you live. The complaint should name the
Commissioner of Social Security as the defendant and should include the Social Security
number(s) shown at the top of this letter.
You or your representative must deliver copies of your complaint and of the summons
issued by the court to the U.S. Attorney for the judicial district where you file your
complaint, as provided in rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
You or your representative must also send copies of the complaint and summons, by certified
or registered mail, to the Social Security Administration's Office of the General Counsel that
is responsible for the processing and handling of litigation in the particular judicial district in
which the complaint is filed. The names, addresses, and jurisdictional responsibilities of
these offices are published in the Federal Register (70 FR 73320, December 9,2005), and are
available on-line at the Social Security Administration's Internet site,
http://policv.ssa.gov/poms.nsflinks/0203106020.
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You or your representative must also send copies of the complaint and summons, by certified
or registered mail, to the Attorney General of the United States, Washington, DC 20530.
Time To File A Civil Action
• You have 60 days to file a civil action (ask for court review).
• The 60 days start the day after you receive this letter. We assume you received this letter
5 days after the date on it unless you show us that you did not receive it within the 5-day
period.
• If you cannot file for court review within 60 days, you may ask the Appeals Council to
extend your time to file. You must have a good reason for waiting more than 60 days to
ask for court review. You must make the request in writing and give your reason(s) in
the request.
You must mail your request for more time to the Appeals Council at the address shown at
the top of this notice. Please put the Social Security number(s) also shown at the top of this
notice on your request. We will send you a letter telling you whether your request for more
time has been granted.
About The Law
The right to court review for claims under Title II (Social Security) is provided for in
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. This section is also Section 405(g) of Title 42 of
the United States Code.
The right to court review for claims under Title XVI (Supplemental Security Income) is
provided for in Section 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act. This section is also Section
1383(c) of Title 42 of the United States Code.
The rules on filing civil actions are Rules 4(c) and (i) in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

See Next Page

. Ian M. Burns (646-74-5764)

Page 3 of 3

v

If You Have Any Questions
Ifyou have any questions, you may call, write, or visit any Social Security office. If you do
call or visit an office, please have this notice with you. The telephone number of the local
oflSce that serves your area is (801) 268-1060. Its address is:
348 East Winchester Street, Suite 100
Murray, UT 84107-8515
The staff there is available to assist you.

Pamela D. Crawford
Administrative Appeals Judge
Enclosure(s)
cc:
William R.Hadley
Attorney at Law
2225 East Murray Holladay Road, #204
Holladay, UT 84117
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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION AND REVIEW

DECISION OF THE APPEALS COUNCIL
In the case of
Gayle Burns o/b/o herself and
IanM. Burns
(Claimant)

Claim for
Child's Insurance Benefits
Mother's Insurance Benefits

646-74-5764 Ian M.Burns
Michael A. Burns
528-47-7242 Gayle Burns
529-49-0701 CI and E
(Wage Earner) (Leave Blank if same as above)
(Social Security Number)
Pursuant to 20 CFR 404.988 and 20 CFR 404.989, this case is before the Appeals Council to
reopen the two hearing decisions of August 22, 2008 issued in connection with Ian Burns' (Ian)
entitlement to child's insurance benefits and Gayle Burns' (Ms. Burns) entitlement to mother's
insurance benefits. The Council's action to reopen the hearing decisions is within four years of
the initial determinations issued on October 2,2005 (Ian, Exhibit 3, p. 10 and Gayle, Exhibit 3,
p.10).1 The Council found there is good cause to reopen the determinations in these cases
because the evidence considered in making the determinations clearly shows that the
Administrative Law Judge's decisions are based on errors. Because both Ian's and Ms. Burns'
entitlement to benefits is dependent upon Ian's relationship to the wage earner within the
meaning of the Social Security Act, rather than issuing two decisions, the Council is issuing this
one decision.
In deciding to take this action, the Council considered a memorandum from the Western
Program Service Center (Exhibit AC-1). The Appeals Council notified Ms. Burns and her
representative of its proposed action and of her rights with respect thereto on February 6, 2009
(Exhibit AC-2). The Council received a responsefromthe claimant's representative dated
March 4, 2009, in which he requested copies of the exhibits and the recording of the hearing held
on October 3, 2007, as well as an extension of time within which to respond to the Council's
notice (Exhibit AC-3). The Council granted this request on March 12, 2009 (Exhibit AC-4). On
March 4, 2009 [sic] (actually March 16, 2009), the claimant's representative requested a copy of
the hearing decision's exhibit list (Exhibit AC-5). The Council sent him such copy on March 24,
2009 (Exhibit AC-6). On April 20,2009, the claimant's representative submitted an April 17,
2009 "Memorandum in Opposition," with attachments (Exhibit AC-7).
1

Because there are separate evidentiary records for each claimant (i.e., Gayle and Ian), this notice refers to exhibits
based on the particular claimant's record.
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In response to the Appeals Council's notice of proposed action dated February 6, 2009, the
claimant's representative referred to the portion of the memorandum from the Western Program
Service Center which indicates that:
In the state of Utah a child born through in vitro fertilization after the death
of the number holder would only be recognized under state intestacy laws if
the parent consented to being a parent "in a record" before the implantation.
In this case there was no such record established (Exhibit AC-1).
The representative argued that the wage earner consented to being a parent "in a record" which
was established prior to his death. He contended that such record consisted of the wage earner's
providing sperm for assisted reproduction by Gayle Burns, his wife; signing and consenting to
the use of his sperm for assisted reproductive purposes; and indicating that, in the event of his
death, he would like his vials of sperm "[maintained in storage for further donation to Gayle
Burns (fill in name and relationship) who will assume all of the obligations and terms described
in this contract" (Gayle, Exhibit 6, pp.2-3). The representative further contended that any
ambiguities in the contract and/or the wage earner's intentions were resolved by testimony and
statements from Ms. Burns and the wage earner's sister, Elizabeth Park, who indicated that the
wage earner had discussed with them, as well as other members of his family that he "wished to
have his wife utilize his frozen semen for assisted reproduction upon his death" (Exhibit AC-7).
The Appeals Council does not find these contentions persuasive.
The memorandum from the Western Program Service Center (Exhibit AC-1) constitutes a
referral of these eases to the Appeals Council for possible consideration and/or review of the
hearing decisions under 20 CFR 404.969(b) and (c). Such memoranda consist of the opinion of
the referring component, with which the Appeals Council may or may not agree. Regardless of
the reason(s) provided for the referral, the Council's decision to review a case is made
independently and pursuant to criteria expressly stated in the Social Security regulations at 20
CFR 404.970 and, as applicable, 404.987. As indicated previously, the Appeals Council asserted
its own motion authority because the Administrative Law Judge's decisions are based on errors
of law (20 CFR 404.970(a)(2)). Such errors as well as the Council's consideration of the
representative's arguments are discussed below.
The Administrative Law Judge decided that "the claimant, Ian Burns, born December 23,2003,
is entitled to surviving dependent child's benefits pursuant to 42 USC §§ 402, et seq. and
20 CFR 404.535, based upon the earnings record of the insured wage earner, Michael Burns,
beginning from the date of the claimant's birth."
The Administrative Law Judge further decided that Gayle Burns is "entitled to mother's
survivorship benefits under 42 USC §§ 402(g)(1), based on the earnings record of the insured
from the time of claimant's birth, when the claimant became an eligible mother."
The Appeals Council incorporates the Administrative Law Judge's statement of the evidence in
this case, and his references to provisions of the Social Security Act and the regulations of the
Social Security Administration, as supplemented herein.
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The issues before the Appeals Council are whether Ian M. Burns is entitled to child's insurance
benefits and whether Gayle Burns is entitled to mother's insurance benefits on the record of the
deceased wage earner.
After considering all the evidence of record, pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations,
the Appeals Council has concluded that Ian is not the child of the wage earner within the
meaning of the Social Security Act, and that therefore Ian is not entitled to child's insurance
benefits and Ms. Burns is not entitled to mother's insurance benefits.
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED
In addition to the records before the Administrative Law Judge, the Appeals Council has
considered and entered into the records the following information:
Exhibit AC-1 A memorandumfrom(he Western Program Service Center dated
October 20,2008
Exhibit AC-2 A copy of the Appeals Council's notice to the claimant dated
February 6,2009
Exhibit AC-3 A letterfromthe claimant's representative to the Appeals Council
dated March 4, 2009
Exhibit AC-4 A copy of the Appeals Council's letter to the claimant's
representative dated March 12,2009
Exhibit AC-5 A letterfromthe claimant's representative to the Appeals Council
dated March 4,2009 [sic] (actually March 16,2009)
Exhibit AC-6 A copy of a letterfromthe Appeals Council to the claimant's
representative dated March 24,2009, with attachments
Exhibit AC-7 A letterfromthe claimant's representative to the Appeals Council
with attachments dated April 17, 2009
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
The evidentiary records contain information that indicates that, in April 2000, the wage earner
was diagnosed with cancer. As part ofhis medical therapy, he had sperm cryopreserved. As part
of the contract for the procedure, the wage earner indicated that, in the event ofhis death, his
semen was to be transferred to his wife, Gayle Burns (Ms. Burns) (Ian, Exhibit 6, pp. 1-5 and 7).
On May 3,2003, the Reproductive Care Center transferred two of nine embryos, which resulted
from the insemination of her eggs with the wage earner's sperm, to Ms. Burns, which resulted in
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her pregnancy. The remaining seven embryos werefrozenfor possible later use. Ian was born
approximately four weeks early on December 23,2003 (Ian, Exhibit 6, p.6 and Exhibit 8).
On September 24,2004, Ms. Burns filed an application for child's insurance benefits on behalf
of her son, Ian M. Burns (Ian), on the record of the wage earner who died on March 24, 2001
(Ian Exhibits 1,2 and 7). On the same day, she also filed an application for mother's insurance
benefits on the basis that she had an entitled child of the wage earner in her care (Gayle, Exhibit
I). The evidentiary records show that Ms. Burns and the wage earner were married on August
24,1997 and that their marriage ended with his death on March 24, 2001 (Ian, Exhibits 5 and 7).
The Social Security Administration determined that Ian is not the child of the wage earner within
the meaning of the Social Security Act, and that he is not entitled to child's insurance benefits
(Ian, Exhibit 3, p. 10). The Agency also determined that Ms. Burns was not entitled to mother's
benefits (Gayle, Exhibit 3, p. 10). In requesting reconsideration, Ms. Burns' representative
contended that Ian had status as child of the wage earner within the meaning of the Act, "[b]ased
on the ruling in the 9th District Court (sic)," and "documentationfromMichael stating what he
wanted done with his sperm after death" (Ian, Exhibit 3, p.8).
On May 16, 2006, the Agency affirmed its initial determinations upon reconsideration (Ian,
Exhibit 3). It determined that the representative's contentions were not persuasive. The Agency
observed that the ruling of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Gillett-Netting only applied to
states in that Circuit (i.e., Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon and Washington). Because Utah is not in the 9th Circuit, the
ruling does not apply in this case (see Social Security Acquiescence Ruling (AR) 05-1(9) and 20
CFR 404.985 regarding the Agency's application of circuit court law).
In concluding that Ian is not the child of the wage earner within the meaning of the Social
Security Act, the Social Security Administration determined that, because the wage earner died
prior to Ian's conception and birth, he had not acknowledged Ian as his son in writing; that there
is no court order of paternity and/or support issued before the wage earner's death; and that,
although Ian is the wage earner's biological child, there is no evidence that the wage earner
either lived with Ian or contributed to Ian's support prior to his death (section 216(h)(3) of the
Social Security Act).
The Agency further determined that Ian would not have inheritance rights in the wage
earner's estate under the laws of the State of Utah because he was neither conceived nor born
during Ms. Burns' marriage to the wage earner, which lastedfromAugust 24,1997 to March 24,
2001, and that, in order to inherit in the State of Utah, a child must have been conceived and/or
born prior to the putative parent's death (Ian, Exhibit 3, p.2). The Agency further determined,
both initially and upon reconsideration, that Ms. Burns' was not entitled to mother's insurance
benefits because she did not have an entitled child of the wage earner in her care (Gayle, Exhibit
3, pp. 3-10). Ms. Burns filed a request for hearing in response to the unfavorable reconsidered
determinations (Ian, Exhibit 3, p. 1 and Gayle, Exhibit 3, p. 1).
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Post-hearing, but before the decision was issued, Ms. Bums submitted information indicating
that, prior to his death, the wage earner, herself, the wage earner's sister and other immediate
family members discussed his situation. During these discussions, the wage earner expressed
"his desire for Gayle Bums to conceive a child by in vitro fertilization using his sperm and thus
would leave his own child in this world by and with his wife, Gayle Bums" (Gayle, Exhibit 20,
p.5).
However, there is no evidence that the wage earner expressed this intent in writing. Ms. Bums
submitted various court documentsfromthe Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, which held that the wage earner intended that she use his semen for in
vitro fertilization, that Ian is the biological child of the wage earner and is recognized as such by
his family, and that "all rights arisingfromsaid parent/child relationship including those of care,
custody, support and inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of Ian M. Burns, a minor"
(Gayle, Exhibits 18 and 20, p.2).
The claimant's representative contended that, "when there is a question on inheritance, a birth
certificate is sufficient to establish inheritance rights," and that Ian's birth certificate showing the
wage earner as his biological father, as well as the court orders, are sufficient to establish his
inheritance rights in the wage earner's estate (Gayle, Exhibit 19).
In his decisions, the Administrative Law Judge reasoned that Ian is the legitimate child of
the deceased wage earner because, although not bom during Ms. Bums' marriage to the wage
earner and not within 300 days of his death, the wage earner intended his sperm to be used by
Ms. Bums to have his child, based upon his providing of such sperm and his discussions with her
and his family. Because Ian is the wage earner's legitimate child, the Administrative Law Judge
concluded that he is entitled to child's insurance benefits on the wage earner's record.
The Administrative Law Judge reasoned that Ian would have inheritance rights in the wage
earner's estate because Ian is his biological child, that a court in the State of Utah held that Ian is
the child of the wage earner and that the wage earner "consented to assisted reproduction by his
wife, which resulted in the birth of the child" (Ian Decision, p.7) The Administrative Law Judge
also reasoned that, because the wage earner entered into a marriage with Ms. Bums prior to his
death, the laws of the State of Utah would recognize Ian as a child of her marriage to the wage
earner.
As indicated above, the Administrative Law Judge issued decisionsfindingthat Ian is the child
of the wage earner within the meaning of the Social Security Act, that he is entitled to child's
insurance benefits on the record of the deceased wage earner, and that, because Ms. Bums has an
entitled child of the wage earner in her care, Ms. Bums is entitled to mother's insurance benefits.
From its review of the evidentiary record, as well as the pertinent sections of the Social Security
Act and the laws of the State of Utah, the Appeals Council finds that the hearing decisions are
erroneous as a matter of law. As such, the Council has concluded that Ian does not have status as
the child of the wage earner within the meaning of the Social Security Act, that he is not entitled
to Social Security child's insurance benefits, and therefore Gayle Bums does not have an entitled
child of the wage earner in her care and is not entitled to mother's insurance benefits.
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If an individual is a child of the wage earner but is not the child of the wage earner under section
216(h)(2)(A) of the Act, such individual shall be deemed to be the child of the wage earner if the
wage earner and the child's mother went through a marriage ceremony (section 216(h)(2)(B) of
the Social Security Act).
The records show that the wage earner died on March 24,2001 (Ian, Exhibit 7 and Gayle,
Exhibit 8); therefore, Ms. Burns and the wage earner were not married at the time Ian was
conceived in May 2003 and born on December 23,2003 (Ian, Exhibit 6, p.6). The Appeals Council
finds that Ian does not have status as the child of the wage earner under section 216(h)(2)(B) of the
Act.
An applicant who is the child of a wage earner, but who is not the child of the wage earner under
section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act, will nevertheless be deemed to be the child of the wage earner if, in
the case of a deceased wage earner, such wage earner has acknowledged in writing that the child is
his son, has been decreed by a court to be the father of the child, or has been ordered by a court to
contribute to the support of the child because the child is his son, and such acknowledgement, court
decree, or court order was made before the death of the wage earner (section 216(h)(3)(C)(i) of the
Social Security Act),
The Appeals Councilfindsthat Ian does not have status as the child of the wage earner under
section 216(h)(3)(C)(i) of the Act because the wage earner was unable to acknowledge Ian as his
son in writing and no court orders of paternity and/or support were issued prior to his death.
Alternately, a child can establish his relationship if the wage earner is shown by evidence
satisfactory to the Commissioner to be the father of the child and was living with or contributing to
the support of the child at the time the wage earner died (section 216(h)(3)(C)(ii) of the Social
Security Act).
Although the record shows that Ian is the biological child of the wage earner, and that this is not in
dispute (Ian, Exhibit 6 and Gayle, Exhibit 6), the wage earner neither lived with nor contributed to
Ian's support during Ms. Burns' pregnancy or after Ian's birth. The Appeals Councilfindsthat Ian
does not have status as child of the wage earner under section 216(h)(3)(C)(ii) of the Act.
A child is entitled to benefits on the earnings record of an insured wage earner who has died if
the child could inherit the wage earner's property under the intestacy laws of the state in which
he was domiciled when he died. Social Security Act § 216(h)(2)(A). In determining whether a
child can inherit a wage earner's property, the Commissioner applies the version of state law that
Is in effect when the claim is being adjudicated. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(4).1

*If the child cannot inherit under the version of State law in effect at the time of
adjudication, then the Commissioner may apply the version of state law that was in effect
when the insured died, or any version of state law in effect from the date the application
was filed up until the Commissioner's final decision on the application to determine whether
a child can inherit a number holder's property. Id. Here, however, the claimant could not inherit under
Utah law in effect at the time oftheNH's death (in 2001), as it required that the claimant be in
gestation at the time of the NH's death in order to inherit by intestate succession. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 75-2-101, 75-2-108. Since the claimant was conceived through artificial
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As such, the Appeals Council applies the current Utah law, which, as amended in 2005,
provides:
If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased
spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented
in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
spouse would be a parent of the child.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-707 (previously numbered as § 78-45g-707).2 The term "record," as
used in this statute, is defined as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." See Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-15-102(22). "'Parent' means an individual who has established a parent-child
relationship under Section 78B-15-201." Id. at 102(17). In relevant part, § 78B-15-201 provides
that a parent-child relationship is established between a man and a child where the "man having
consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7, Assisted Reproduction [e.g.,
§ 78B-15-707], which resulted in the birth of the child." See zW. at § 78B-15-201 (e).
In this case^ the wage earner died before placement of the sperm and did not consent in a
"record" to be the "parent" of the child in the event of his death. Infindingto the contrary, the
Administrative Law Judge relied upon a Semen Storage Agreement the wage earner entered into
prior to his death, which states, in relevant part:
I.

N

In the event of the death of the donor the donor would like his vials of
semen (initial one of the items below):
a.
Destroyed (Blank)
b.
Maintained in storage for future donation to Gavle Burns \the
NH's wife) (fill in name and relationship) who will assume all of
the obligations and terms described in this contract. (NH's initials).

See, Semen Storage Agreement § I. This agreement, while expressing the wage earner's intent to
donate the cryopreserved sperm and its related contractual obligations to his wife in the event of
his death, is not sufficient to show that the NH actually consented to being the "parent" of the
child pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-707, a fact which the Administrative Law Judge
acknowledges. See, Decision at 6 ("The Semen Storage Agreement does not contain the specific
language of parentage....").
In making hisfindingsand decision, the Administrative Law Judge relied on extraneous
evidence (Decision at 6) not a part of the contract (parol evidence) such as testimony about
previous oral conversations between the wage earner and his family, to bolster hisfindingthat
wage earner intended to be the posthumously conceived child's "parent," as the statute
methods after the death of the NH, he would not qualify as an Intestate heir under Utah law
in effect as of the NH's death. Id.
2

Utah is one of several states to adopt this provisionfromthe Uniform Parentage Act.
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specifically requires that the consent be in a written or otherwise retrievable "record." Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78B-15-707, 78B-15-102(22). Furthermore, the Semen Storage Agreement in this
case contains an integration/merger provision expressly precluding reference to outside evidence
in construing its terms, stating that it "represents the entire agreement between parties and there
are no understandings, agreements, or representations other than as set forth herein." See Semen
Storage Agreement § S. The Appeals Council concludes that, based on the Utah State's
definition of "record", the Administrative Law Judge should not have considered the extraneous
evidence in making his determination.
As indicated in the Appeals Council's notice of February 6,2009, the Utah Uniform Probate
Code (the Code) makes no statutory provision for inheritance for individuals, such as Ian,
procreated through artificial methods (such as artificial insemination), after the death of a
decedent. From its review of the laws of the State of Utah, the Council concluded that, under
Utah's rules of statutory construction, this omission indicates non-coverage, and that it
eliminates from the class of those who can inherit by intestate succession any children procreated
through artificial methods after the death of a decedent. Because Ian was procreated through
artificial methods after the death of the wage earner, the Council finds that he does not qualify as
an intestate heir under Utah State law.
The claimant's representative has also contended that Ian has status as child of the wage earner
under section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act because a court in the State of Utah
ordered that the wage earner is Ian's father, that Ian is his heir and that, as such, Ian has
inheritance rights in the wage earner's estate. The Appeals Council does not find this contention
persuasive.
The Social Security Administration is not bound by the State court's findings as to
paternity and intestacy in this case. The Agency must follow a State court's decision only
when four prerequisites are met: 1) an issue in a claim for Social Security benefits has been
determined by a state court of competent jurisdiction; 2) the issue was genuinely contested
before the State court by parties with opposing interests; 3) the issue falls within the general
category of domestic relations law; and 4) the resolution by the State trial court is consistent with
the law enunciated by the highest court in the State. See, Program Operations Manual System
GN § 00306.001(C)(3) and Social Security Ruling 83-37c (discussing Gray v. Richardson, 414
F.2d 1370 (1973)). Here, although the Utah court has determined the issue of paternity and that
issue falls within the general category of domestic relations, under (1) and (3) above, the other
two requirements have not been satisfied.
The issues were not "genuinely contested" by parties with opposing interests under (2). Rather,
both relevant issues decided by the Utah court, paternity and the child's intestate inheritance
status, were undisputed. Indeed, the State court judge's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law" as to paternity state that the special administrator of the wage earner's estate as well as the
wage earner's "family
including grandparents, uncles, cousins, nephews and nieces, all
openly recognize [the child] as their grandchild, nephew and cousin and the natural son of [the
wage earner]." Because the relevant issues were not rendered in a contested proceeding, the
Agency is not bound by the State court's findings. Gray, 474 F.2d at 1373.
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With regard to Gray as set forth in the requirement at (4) above, the Appeals Council is of the
opinion that the State court's determination in this case is inconsistent with the law as would be
enunciated by the highest court of the State. The Council is unaware of any Utah case actually
construing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-707, but believes that the highest court would agree with
its analysis above, and would conclude that the Semen Storage Agreement in this particular case
was insufficient to show that the wage earner consented in a "record" to be the "parent" of a
child produced from that semen after his death. As such, the Agency is not bound by the State
court's findings. Id.
*

FINDINGS

After careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Appeals Council finds:
1. The wage earner died on March 24,2001.
2. After the wage earner's death, Gayle Burns became pregnant through a
process of in vitro fertilization using the wage earner's cryopreserved sperm.
3. Ian M. Burns isthe biological child of the deceased wage earner.
4. Ian M. Burns was born on December 23,2003.
5. Ian M. Burns would not have inheritance rights in the wage earner's estate
Under the laws of the State of Utah.
6. Ian M. Burns was neither conceived nor born during the marriage between
Gayle Burns and the wage earner.
7. No court issued an order of paternity and/or support prior to the wage earner's
death, finding that he was the father of Ian M. Burns.
8. The wage earner neither lived with nor contributed to the support of Ian M.
Burns during Gayle Burns' pregnancy or after he was born.
9. Ian M. Burns is not the child of the wage earner within the meaning of the
Social Security Act.
10. Ian M. Burns is not entitled to child's insurance benefits.
11. Gayle Burns does not have an entitled child of the wage earner in her care.
12. Gayle Burns is not entitled to mother's insurance benefits.

See Next Page
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and Gayle Burns is not entitled to mother's insurance benefits under sections 202(d) and 202(g),
respectively, of title II of the Social Security Act.
APPEALS COUNCIL
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WELLIAMR. HADLEY #5282
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204
Holladay.UT 84117
Telephone: (801) 277-4292
Facsimile: (801)277-4295
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PETITION FOR ADJUDICATION OF
INTESTACY, DETERMINATION OF
HERS, AND APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

IN THE MATTER OF
Deceased.

Probate No.
Judge

COMES NOW the petitioner#

, by and through counsel, William R. Hadley,

and represents to the Registrar that:
1. Applicant's interest in this matter is that of:
A)~ An heir of the decedent.
B)

A child of the decedent.

C)

A devisee of the decedent's will.

D)JL The spouse of the decedent
E) _ A creditor of the decedent
F)

A person having priority for appointment as personal representative.

\^J

^

G) _ A person having a property right in or a claim against the decedent's estate.
H)

Afiduciaryrepresenting an interested person.

2.

The d e c e d e n t , 4 0 f c p f f ^ g p B B ) f l ^ ^ B H N M 0 M t , at the age of J

3.

Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this
county.

4.

The names and addressed ofthe spouse, children, heirs, and devisees ofthe decedent,
and the ages of those who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with
reasonable diligence by applicant, are as follows:

NAME

ADDRESS

AGE RELATIONSHIP
Adult

Spouse

#years

Son

Adult

Sister

5.

No personal representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere.

6.

The appointment ofa special administrator is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest
with the estate in a related matter presently before j f l t H H R B H ^ H f l P

m

*he

Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah under Case
i which is a proceeding to determine the paternity of the minor child,

Petitionfor Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination
ofHeirs, and Appointment ofSpecialAdministrator
Probate No.

•\J

That ' g f l f l f l H P i f l P B H H H Q the person to be appointed as Special
Administrator is decedent's-sister and is qualified to act as such.
Applicant has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice of any probate
or appointment proceeding concerning the decedent that may have beenfiledin this
state or elsewhere.
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3-107(2) there are no statutes of limitation to determine
heirs of an estate and such petition is proper.
10.

Pursuant to U.C.A, § 75-3-107(3) there is a presumption of intestacy as no will has
been probated within three yearsfromdate of the decedent's death.

11.

That notice to creditors should be waived.

12.

That bond should be waived.

13.

That all other notices, except those specifically referenced herein, should be waived.

WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:
1.

2.
3.

That the Court enter an Order of Intestacy of this estate.

Thst^///////////^
T h e f l l H M H H I H H B b e appointed special administrator in reference to
Third District Court Case No. 074904953.

DATED this

day of February, 2008.

WILLIAM R.HADLEY
PeMonfor Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination
ofHeirs, and Appointment of Special Administrator
Probate No.

3

w

VERIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of SALT LAKE

: ss.
)

If Applicant is Individual
Applicant, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing petition are true,
accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and belief.

n,

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this / f day of February, 2008,

Notary Public

;

WILLIAM B.HAQLEY 8
2225 East Murray HoHadoy Road «04 s
Salt Uk8 City, Uteh 84117
1
My Commission Expires
.
August 08,2000
I

\*mm

L» «« mm^^^S^J^L .» «J

i
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WILLIAM R. HADLEY* #5282
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C.
2225 E Murray Holladay Road #204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 '••
Telephone: (801) 277-4292
Facsimile: (801) 277-4295 . ••;
Attorney for Applicant

%

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF j

INFORMAL ADJUDICATION OF
INTESTACY, DETERMINATION OF
HEIRS, AND APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

Deceased.
ProbateNo:0£5^
Judge

O ^ B

Upon consideration of the Informal Appointment of Special Administrator filed by W h
spouse of the decedent, on me 1 today of February, 2008, the Registrar finds that:
1.

The application is complete and complies with the provisions of the Utah Uniform
Probate Code.

2.

Good cause for the request for appointment has been shown.

3..

Any required notice has been given or waived.

4.

The applicant has made an oath or affirmation that the statements contained in the
application are, true to the best of her knowledge and belief.

\J

W="

5.

The applicant appearsfromthe application to be an interested person as defined
M^

6.

Onthe basis ofthe statements inthe application, venue is proper.

7.

J B I B H l B H H B M f l ^ is the proper person to act as special administrator.

8.

Bond is not required of is waived.

9.

On the basis ofthe statements in the application:
a. > X No personal representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere.

10.

It appearsfromthe application that the time limit for informal appointment has
not expired.

11.•.'•••'• On the basis of the statements in the application, the decedent died intestate.
12.

Based on the statements inthe application, the person whose appointment as
ispecial administrator is sought is qualified to act as special administrator and has a
prior right to appointment.

13.

That the decedent left as heirs his wife, 6 t f H 0 H H L petitioner, and a minor
son,VMN^^pNlHVV0MMflHflP^Mi

NOW, THEREFORE:
1.

That the decedent died intestate.

2.

That the heirs are *

INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR In the Matter ofthe Estate of MICHAEL A. BURNS
Probate No.

2

W:

w

3.

lis hereby appointed special administrator of the estate of
decedent, to act without bond, to assist the estate in any conflicts of interests that
may arise in a related matter in 'the Third Judicial District Coiirt Case No.
> before the Honorablel

6.

Upon qualification and acceptance, letters of special administration shall be
••• •' issued.-'.

DATED this 1^? day of February, 2008.

Registrar f\

BvBV:

yf'

STAMP i ^ E D AT Dtl

I GERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF
AN ORIGINAL 00CUMENT ON RLE IN THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE
E
COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
n/.Tf

INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Estate of MICHAEL A. BURNS
Probate No.

3

(
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X
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WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282
HADLEY AND HADLEY, L.C.
2225 E. Murray Holladay Rd., Ste
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Telephone: (801) 277-4292 .
Facsimile: (801)277-4295
Attorney for Applicant

*

W

204

m

IN THE THDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND

FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

) _ O F ADMINISTRATION
;

X ) Y OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATION

•

•

'

'

.'

•

"

•

•

•••..•

.

'

•

.

.

-

.

•.

J"--. ProbateNo: : 0 ^ > f t 0 0 2^>
'. Judge
1-

JBMMtMttflMflflB> was dirty appointed and quaM
'•'.,

General Personal Representative

_JL Special Administrator
of the estate of the above-named decedent on the Jf2day of February, 2008, by the: •

- : .•;>.;. •;•.;• X e o u r t ,

.: ' ^ ( v ^

_Registrar, with ;
_ a l l authority pertaining thereto.

;.".'•'•*• -;V. -'
:
:

•

«

•

•

•

•

. . .

-

r\

_ all authority pertaining thereto, except.

2. Administration of the estate is:
a) 2L unsupervised.
b) _ supervised. The above-named personal representative or special
administrator may not make any distribution of the estate without prior court
order.
These letters are issued to evidence the appointment, qualification, and authority of the
said special administrator.
WITNESS, my signature and the Seal of this Court, this ¥b day of February,

or Registrar of th<

By:

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE.IN THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE
COUNTY. STATE.OF UTAH.
DATE- / p g i

LETTERS
Estate of Michael A. Burns
Case No.:

